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Editor’s Note 
 
 Thank you for downloading the digital edition of the PACE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM.  Thanks to the Volume 4 
Editorial Board, the Forum is accessible digitally, compatible with tablets and e-
readers.  As you read, take advantage of clickable Tables of Contents and links to 
online sources throughout the issue. 
 The Forum, known colloquially to the Pace community as PIPSELF, 
celebrates its fifth anniversary.  Since its inception, PIPSELF has grown in both 
size and stature, thanks to the dedication and determination of past and present 
Editorial Boards.  The premier volume featured compositions compiled by and 
prepared for publication solely by the four founding members. Today, the journal 
comprises a fully staffed Editorial Board and a roster of Associate Editors. 
 The Volume 5 Editorial Board would like to give special thanks to our new 
Faculty Advisor, Professor Leslie Garfield, for all of her supervision and guidance as 
a managerial advisor this year.  In addition, the present Editorial Board is 
extremely grateful to the Pace University School of Law Library Staff for their 
continued assistance and encouragement.  A special thank you to Professor Lucie 
Olejnikova for her availability and support throughout the school year. 
The staff of PIPSELF has worked diligently this year in selecting and 
preparing original and appealing articles concerning emerging issues in the fields of 
intellectual property, sports, and entertainment law for this issue.    We welcome 
our readers to send comments and feedback: e-mail us at pipself@law.pace.edu, visit 
our Twitter @PIPSELF, or ‘like’ us on Facebook at “Pace Intellectual Property, 
Sports & Entertainment Law Forum.” 
—  Alexia Mickles 
Editor-in-Chief 
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“All men must die.” 
−Valyrian Proverb 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The television show Game of Thrones has developed a tremendous following 
in recent years.  The show takes place primarily in the fictional state of Westeros, a 
feudal society that mirrors many of the legal structures of medieval England.  As 
such, many of the laws and customs of Westeros seem antithetical to the beliefs and 
values of modern viewers.  In an attempt to posit a more just outcome following the 
death of Westeros’ king (the action which springboards the primary power struggle), 
this Article applies California law to the disposition of King Robert’s property.  
Shockingly, this Article finds that California’s marital presumption laws are as 
unsettling as some of the laws found in Westeros itself. 
This Article argues that the current marital presumption laws are outdated 
and badly in need of reform.  Using the disposition of King Robert’s property as an 
example, this Article critiques the modern California Family Code’s approach to 
paternity disestablishment.  Part I provides a description of the marital 
presumption rule.  Part II applies it to situations such as King Robert’s where the 
father incorrectly believed that a child was his own.  Part III concludes by 
suggesting how the law should be altered to create a more just outcome to 
situations of mistaken paternity. 
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While more information can be gleaned from A Song of Fire and Ice book 
series, this Article relies on the information obtained through the HBO series unless 
otherwise indicated.  Additionally, this Article only addresses the disposition of 
property as it would occur under California law. 
 
 
 
 
 
II. HEIR, HERE? 
The following section explains the marital presumption rule, its justification, 
and how one would rebut the presumption. 
A. What is the Marital Presumption? 
The marital presumption law states that if a man’s wife has a child during 
the course of the marriage the man is the presumed biological father of the child.1  
This presumption arose to prevent children from being labeled as illegitimate (due 
to associated social and legal stigmas), to address a lack of available scientific tools, 
to encourage personal responsibility for children, and to protect the integrity of the 
family unit.2 
                                                          
1 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2014). 
2 See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the Paternity of Marital Children, 
37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 56 (2003) (genetic testing was not available until the 20th century, whereas the rule 
originated in the 18th century); Niccol D. Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children’s Lives – 
Recreating Paternity Fraud Laws to Protect Children’s Interests, 6 J. L. FAM. STUD 237, 242 (2004); In 
re Paterson's Estate, 93 P.2d 825, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).  
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B. Fading Justification for the Martial Presumption Rule 
These justifications, however, are no longer as salient as they once were.  
Today, children do not face substantial social and legal stigmas based on the 
marital status of their parents.  As the number of children born out of wedlock has 
increased, the social stigma associated with children born out of wedlock has 
decreased.3  Additionally, legislatures have passed numerous statutes forbidding 
discrimination based on the marital status of a child’s parents.4  Furthermore, 
today’s courts are not limited by a lack of scientific tools.  Modern genetic testing 
can determine whether a man is the biological father of a child with almost 
complete certainty.5  Therefore, social stigmas, legal stigmas, and a lack of scientific 
tools no longer form a legitimate justification for the marital presumption rule. 
The remaining justifications for the rule are alleged support for personal 
responsibility of children and protection of the family unit.  Application of this rule, 
however, does not encourage personal responsibility; it merely shifts who is 
presumed responsible for taking care of the child.  The marital presumption rule 
allows a man to father children with a married woman and permits him to escape 
all legal and financial responsibility.6  In fact, that is exactly what happened in this 
case study.  Furthermore, forcing a legal fiction of parenthood does not ensure the 
stability or longevity of the family unit.  Prohibiting divorce does not ensure that all 
marriages are happy and, in the same way, prohibiting paternity disputes does not 
ensure that all families will be cohesive. 
The sad truth is that the courts no longer enforce the marital presumption 
rule because of rational justifications; the courts enforce the marital presumption 
law because it is administratively convenient and straightforward.  As scholars 
have pointed out, however, “convenience should not require that a husband remain 
financially responsible for the actions of other men.”7 
C. Rebutting the Presumption 
While still rebuttable, the marital presumption is “one of the strongest and 
most persuasive presumptions known to the law.”8  Rebutting the marital 
                                                          
3 See Brady E. Hamilton, et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2012, 62 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REP. 2 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_03.pdf (concluding that 4.53% of 
children were born out of wedlock in 2012). 
4Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Marital and Non-Marital 
Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
5 Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Paternity: Parentage Testing GENETIC PROFILES CORP., 
http://www.geneticprofiles.com/main_files/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (“DNA Profiling can 
establish that the alleged father is the child's biological father with a probability of paternity of 99% 
or higher.”). 
I. 6 SEE VERONICA SUE GUNDERSON, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN PARENTAGE: AN ARGUMENT 
AGAINST THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION, 11 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 335, 349 (2007). 
7 Gunderson, supra note 6, at 349. 
8 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540; Richard B. v. Sandra B.B., 625 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (App. Div. 1995). 
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presumption adheres to a strict statute of limitations: a parent wishing to 
disestablish the presumption of paternity must raise a claim within two years of the 
child’s birth.9  The claim can be brought by the husband, presumed father, or the 
child.10  Genetic testing can be used, but the statute provides little guidance for how 
to apply these scientific tests and their implications.11 
 
III. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND THE APPLICATION OF THE MARITAL 
PRESUMPTION  
 
The distribution of King’s Robert’s property would be different under 
California law in three ways: (1) the application of California’s slayer statute, (2) 
the application of California law concerning illegitimate children, and (3) the 
application of the marital presumption rule. 
Before diving into the ways in which California law is distinct from Westeros 
law, an overview of California’s property rules is in order.  In California, property 
consists of both community property and separate property.  Property produced 
during the marriage and by the labor of either spouse is termed community 
property.  When one of the marriage participants dies, the decedent is allowed to 
distribute half of the community property via will or that half will be distributed via 
intestate succession.  Things that are not considered community property include 
(1) property acquired before the marriage, (2) property acquired after a divorce, or 
(3) property acquired without labor (i.e. inheritance).  Separate property, on the 
other hand, is held by individuals and held separately from the spouse.  When one 
of the marriage participants dies, the decedent is allowed to distribute all of the 
separate property via a will or that separate property will be distributed via 
intestate succession.  The following section discusses the distribution of King 
Robert’s half community property and the entirety of his separate property. 
 
                                                          
9 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
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A. Barred Inheritance for Slayers 
 
First, California probate law prevents a slayer from inheriting property from 
his spouse, while Westeros law does not.  A slayer is an individual who intentionally 
and feloniously kills his spouse. 12  Normally, under intestate succession, the 
surviving spouse of the decedent is entitled to half community property and one-
third separate property of the decedent’s property slated for disposition.13  Here, 
however, Cersei’s orchestration of King Robert’s death pegs her as a slayer and bars 
her from inheriting any property from him.  Cersei instructed Robert’s squire to 
intoxicate him during the boar hunt to increase the chances of Robert dying in a 
hunting accident.  This demonstrates the necessary intent to qualify as a slayer, 
and the murder itself qualifies as felonious.  Therefore, Cersei will not be able to 
inherit any property from her late husband. 
B. Inheritance Rights of Children Born Out of Wedlock  
Second, California probate law allows children born out of wedlock to inherit 
property, while Westeros law does not.  Robert’s illegitimate children would benefit 
substantially under California’s property laws because California grants the same 
inheritance rights to children born out of wedlock as it affords to children born to 
married parents.14  California intestacy statutes indicate that if the decedent’s wife 
is either deceased or barred from inheritance, all of the property will be inherited by 
                                                          
12 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541.  
13 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401 (West 2014). 
14 See Lewis, supra note 4. 
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the issue of the decedent.15  Robert’s illegitimate children, Gendry and Barra, 
qualify as issue and therefore stand to inherit part—and potentially all—of King 
Robert’s estate. 
C. The Iron Grip of Marital Presumption  
Third, California family law adheres to the marital presumption law, while 
Westeros law does not.  Cersei admits that her children were not fathered by 
Robert16 and Ned’s analysis of genetic lineage confirms her statement.17   Despite 
this conclusive information disproving Robert’s paternity, neither a confession nor 
genetic testing can overcome the presumption.  Additionally, Ned lacks standing to 
bring this claim.18  California’s family laws dictate that, despite clear evidence to 
the contrary, Joffrey, Myrcella, and Tommen are legally King Robert’s issue, and as 
such, they each would inherit one-fifth of the King’s separate property and one-
tenth of the King’s community property.  Robert’s actual issue would be forced to 
share his property with Cersei’s children, despite clear parental fraud. 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. Proceedings with Caution 
The initial response to a case study like the one above is to abolish the 
marital presumption rule.  Before rash action is taken, however, there are two 
major problems with eliminating this rule. First, it would punish the child as well 
as the mother. Second, it would model the law based on an anomaly.  When deceit 
occurs the wrongdoing falls on the shoulders of the mother, not the child; however, 
marital presumption laws protect both parties.  As a result, alterations to marital 
presumption laws also have the potential to hurt both parties.  Caution should be 
taken to avoid harming a child who played no role in deceiving a parent.  
Furthermore, abolishing the marital presumption law suggests that the norm 
involves married women giving birth to illegitimate children left and right.  The 
problem of parental fraud exists, but it is not so rampant as to form the basis of our 
legal structure.  These problems suggest that minor changes, rather than a 
complete overhaul, is the proper way to proceed. 
An alternative to abolishment of the presumption is strengthening the tools 
to rebut the presumption.  This Article’s suggested changes will not fix all of the 
problems that arose in this case study.  Under both the current family code and this 
Article’s proposed changes, Joffrey, Myrcella, and Tommen will still inherit.  Their 
mother lied to her husband, her children, and the kingdom; yet she will not be 
                                                          
15 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402. 
16 Game of Thrones: You Win or You Die (HBO television broadcast May 29, 2011).   
17 Game of Thrones: A Golden Crown (HBO television broadcast May 22, 2011). 
18 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540. 
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punished for her deceit.  While proposals exist to eliminate parental fraud,19 they 
are drastic and reduce the family unit to expectation of a series of lawsuits based on 
genetic links.  California cannot write its laws with Cersei as the prototypical 
mother and Joffrey as the prototypical son.  Laws cannot be based off of outliers, 
lest society allows the innocent to be punished along with the guilty.  Instead, this 
Article applies a few changes to our existing system to feasibly achieve a more just 
system. 
B. A Partial Solution 
There are a few simple tweaks that would go a long way in preventing 
parental fraud problems in the future.  First, the California Family Code should 
adjust the statute of limitations to run from knowledge of the paternity issue rather 
than from birth.  Second, the law should allow genetic testing to help disprove 
paternity, but limits should be placed on the genetic tests to prevent abuse.  
Considering each of these suggestions would go a long way towards remedying an 
outdated common law doctrine. 
i. Changing the Time Frame of the Statute of Limitations 
Currently, the statute of limitations is set at two years after the child’s 
birth.20  If the father has no reason to suspect that his wife has been unfaithful 
during this time period, he will unknowingly run out the clock.  Two reasons to 
justify the “from birth” statute of limitations include: (1) ease of the court system to 
avoid later litigation, and (2) emotional and financial stability for the child. 
While predictability is important and forms the basis of different legal 
concepts, the concept can only go so far.  Setting a statute of limitations without 
regard to knowledge prevents men from seeking justice for parental fraud. 
While the goal of achieving a stable emotional environment is admirable, it is 
a fiction to believe that a short statute of limitations achieves this goal.  A father 
who finds out that a child is not his own is unlikely to preserve and provide the 
emotional stability hoped for by the courts, regardless of a lack of legal remedies. 
Rather than starting the clock from the moment the child was born, the clock 
should start running from when the father gained real or constructive knowledge 
that the child was not his own.  Tolling the statute of limitations to begin after 
notice is common in other areas of law.21   This alteration would prevent adulterers 
like Cersei from bragging about her deception with impunity.  By altering the 
                                                          
19 Kording, supra note 2, at 265-68 (suggesting mandatory genetic testing at birth to prevent 
parental fraud). 
20 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540. 
21 E.g.,CAL. PEN. CODE § 803 (West 2015) (asserting a discovery rule within criminal law); CAL. CODE 
CIV. PROC. § 340 (West 2014) (asserting a discovery rule within tort law); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338 
(West 2014) (asserting a discovery rule within property law). 
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starting point of the statute of limitations, the law will permit a more realistic 
opportunity for men to rebut the marital presumption. 
ii. Clarifying Limitations to Genetic Testing 
It is laudable that the California Family Code allows genetic testing to prove 
or disprove parentage, however, the parameters of this rule should be clarified.  
Courts should place limitations on DNA testing, and Uniform Parentage Act (2002) 
provides helpful guidelines for when and how to incorporate genetic testing.  In 
order to be entered into evidence, genetic tests must be either (1) court-ordered, or 
(2) with the full consent of all parties.22  Secretly conducting a genetic test of the 
family members in question would undermine the family structure and serve as a 
major violation of privacy.  While Ned’s actions were guided by moral principles, his 
analysis of Joffrey’s, Myrcella’s, and Tommen’s genetic heritage should not be 
admissible in court. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The marital presumption rule persists because of its entanglements with 
other laws and social policies.  The common law rule and newer family codes seek to 
protect the family unit while providing a remedy for parental fraud and creating a 
framework for dealing with scientific advancements.  Keeping all of these 
considerations in balance is a difficult task and perhaps a perfect solution does not 
exist. 
This Article suggests that small steps, rather than massive reform, are the 
preferred route to improving this doctrine.  Readjusting the start date of the statute 
of limitations and creating more specific guidelines for DNA testing are some of 
these small developments that will improve the system without destroying the 
family unit.  More steps will need to be taken as science continues to advance and 
as families create more interesting case studies with which to grapple.
                                                          
22 Uniform Parentage Act § 621(e) (2002), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf.  
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Abstract 
 
 Starting in late 2012, and continuing into late 2013, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York wreaked havoc on the 
traditional interpretation of the copyright infringement defense known as “fair use.”  
Two cases stemming from the advent of the Google Books Project are Author’s 
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. These cases 
adopted a controversial interpretation of the fair use defense, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 
107, when each case determined that the mass digitization of thousands of books 
constituted fair use merely because the digitization was what is known as 
“transformative use.” 
 This Comment will explore the background of the fair use defense, from its 
common law origins, to its codification in the 1976 Copyright Act, to its application 
in modern law.  Keeping this background in mind will explain why the current legal 
state of the fair use defense, as propagated by the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York and the United States Courts Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is 
inconsistent with traditional statutory construction principles.  
 Proposed recommendations to solve legal inconsistencies in Section 107 can 
come from clarification either from Congress by way of an amendment to this 
Section, or by a decision from the United States Supreme Court. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On October 10, 2012, Judge Baer handed down a decision that fueled 
dramatic change to the fair use doctrine of U.S. copyright law.  In Author’s Guild v. 
HathiTrust, Judge Baer upheld the actions of a group of academic libraries to 
digitize their collections by partnering with Google in the Google Books project.1  
The court held that these actions did not fall under the Copyright Act’s library 
exception, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 108, but instead would be afforded a fair use 
defense, found at 17 U.S.C. § 107.2 
On November 13, 2013, Judge Chin of the same court continued this 
dramatic change by ruling for a commercial entity with a fair use defense.  In 
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Judge Chin upheld Google’s fair use defense for 
the complete copying and digital reproduction of millions of copyrighted materials.3 
These holdings are a radical change from precedent leading up to the 
codification of the fair use defense.4  Only the Ninth Circuit applies the fair use 
defense as the New York courts did, using a contested interpretation of 
transformative use, which was a major basis for both Author’s Guild decisions.5  
Each Southern District of New York judge focused on the way that defendants, 
Google and HathiTrust, transformed the copyrighted works in new and socially 
valuable ways that varied greatly from the uses of the original books and articles.6  
Traditionally, the fair use judicial interpretation balanced rewarding authors and 
creators with intellectually enriching the public; the dramatic shift in the Southern 
                                                          
1 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the fair use 
defense was available to the universities and that the systematic digitization of copyrighted books 
contained within the universities libraries’ was protected by the fair use doctrine). 
2 Id. at 456-58. 
3 Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the fair use 
defense was available to Google, a commercial Internet search engine, for the systematic digitization 
of copyrighted books from partner libraries). 
4 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010); see generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(enumerating the fair use defense as it was usually applied at common law as well as the four factors 
generally associated with those codified in the current Copyright Act). 
5 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that displaying a ‘thumbnail’ 
version of a copyrighted picture on an Internet search engine was a transformative use, and 
therefore protectable under the fair use doctrine); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Google’s use of ‘thumbnail’ images of copyrighted images was a 
transformative use and protectable under the fair use doctrine). But see, e.g. Sandford Gray 
Thatcher, One Publisher’s Take on the Google Decision, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/one-publishers-take-on-the-google-books-decision. 
6 See generally Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282  (explaining that Google’s scanning of the copyrighted 
books into a keyword searchable online database was transformative from the original use of the 
books); see generally HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (finding that the works in the HathiTrust 
Digital Library transformative because they serve a different purpose, i.e. search capability, than the 
original copyrighted works). 
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District of New York and Ninth Circuit courts now allows mass digitization 
of copyrighted works to continue without the permission of copyright holders.7 
 This Comment will argue that the growing theory of transformative use as 
propagated by the Ninth Circuit, and adopted by New York’s Southern District, is a 
judicial interpretation that is not consistent with statutory construction principles.  
The decisions in HathiTrust and Google, extending the Ninth Circuit broad view of 
transformative use, stray too far from the traditional analysis of the fair use 
doctrine.  Congressional intent is at odds with this broad interpretation, and the 
principles of the Copyright Act would be better served by returning to a more 
traditional interpretation.  In lieu of returning to a more traditional judicial 
interpretation of the fair use doctrine, there are a few legislative-based alternatives 
that would allow for this kind of digitization to continue without straying from the 
traditional statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 Part Two of this Comment explores the background of the fair use doctrine 
from its common law origins and codification through to its application in modern 
law.   This exploration will focus on relevant case law that developed the fair use 
doctrine until its codification in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and the general application 
following codification. Part Two also describes the broad Ninth Circuit 
interpretation of the fair use doctrine, particularly the theory of transformative use.  
Additionally, this part details the Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s 
Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. decisions. Finally, this subsection explains the basics of a 
statutory construction analysis. 
 Part Three analyzes why the transformative use interpretation is 
inconsistent with traditional statutory construction principles by looking to 17 
U.S.C. § 107 and its legislative history in order to conduct a statutory construction 
analysis of the statutes.  Part Three also explains why the decisions in Google and 
in HathiTrust, specifically, veer too far from the principles of statutory construction. 
 Part Four provides legislative and judicial solutions to the issue of 
interpreting the fair use doctrine, and more specifically, how the transformative use 
theory factors in to the overall analysis. 
Finally, Part Five concludes by reiterating that the current fair use defense, 
as it exists in modern copyright law, is inconsistent with statutory construction 
principles.  
 
II. FROM COMMON LAW TO CODIFIED LAW TO TRANSFORMATIVE LAW: TRACING THE 
HISTORY OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
 
In what is known as the Copyright Clause, the United States Constitution 
gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
                                                          
7 See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (adopting Judge Leval’s view 
of transformative use to help analyze the first factor of the four factor fair use doctrine test) (citing 
Leval, infra note 24). 
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”8  This clause embodies the delicate balance 
struck between rewarding an author for time and effort put into creating a work 
and limiting the monopoly protection to a certain amount of time, providing the 
public with access to the work.9  The fair use defense plays a significant role in this 
balance because it attempts to limit the protection given to the authors by giving 
members of the public who meet certain criteria an affirmative defense to their 
infringement of an author’s copyrighted material.10 
This section discusses the origins of the fair use defense and its original 
application, the codification of fair use in the Copyright Act, and finally, how it is 
applied in modern law.   
A. Humble Beginnings: History of Fair Use and Creation of 17 U.S.C. § 107 
Justice Story once opined that “copyrights approach, nearer than any other 
class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the 
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile 
[sic] and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”11  Justice Story means it is 
often difficult in copyright cases to come to fitting conclusions or create principles 
that can be generally applied to all copyright cases.12  Copyright infringement cases, 
by nature, need to be examined and analyzed case-by-case, as copying one line of a 
novel may be considered infringement, whereas copying large chunks may not be 
found to infringe depending on other facts and circumstances.13 
The fair use defense is no different in that judges need to examine and 
analyze the argument on a case-by-case basis.  Justice Story recognized this in the 
first case found to enumerate the factors we now know as part of the fair use 
defense.14   In Folsom v. Marsh, the plaintiff had created a work on the life of 
President George Washington, which included personal letters written by 
                                                          
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
10 17 U.S.C. § 107 (allowing those defendants who meet the criteria an affirmative defense for 
infringement when it is used for purposes such as teaching, reporting, or researching following an 
analysis of four factors).  
11 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 344-45. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985) (stating that there is no generally applicable fair use definition that can be applied, so each 
case must decided on its own facts); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
448 (1984) (allowing a Court to use section 107 to apply an equitable rule of reason analysis to claims 
based on their particular facts); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (“Indeed, since the [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no 
generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its 
own facts.”); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975) (“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what 
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”). 
14 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342. 
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Washington along with his biography.15  The plaintiff edited a twelve-volume work 
on the life of President George Washington, the first volume containing a biography 
and the following eleven volumes containing verbatim copies of President 
Washington’s personal and private letters, messages and other public acts, with 
some explanatory notes from the editor.16   Justice Story found that the defendant 
used some of the letters from the plaintiff’s work in creating his own, shorter 
biography of Washington in two volumes, copying 353 pages identically, with 319 of 
these pages containing the contested verbatim copies of the Washington’s letters.17 
In 1841, the Circuit Court of Massachusetts was confronted with the 
questions of whether such copying was considered piracy, and if there were any 
affirmative defenses to such copying.18  Justice Story laid out some factors that 
could be used to determine if a person had pirated another’s copyrighted work, but 
would not be held liable for his or her piracy in coming to this decision.19  This case 
is the common law foundation of the analysis of the current fair use defense in U.S. 
Copyright law.20 
Most courts have adopted these factors to help determine if a fair use defense 
was applicable in any given case.21  They were so prevalent in fact, that they were 
codified as the factors for judicial consideration in the 1976 Copyright Act.22  These 
factors include “the purpose and character of the use,” which includes consideration 
of whether the use is commercial or not “the nature of the copyrighted work, the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”23 The fair use section says that fair use of a copyrighted work for 
the purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or 
research is not considered an infringement of copyright.24  The section then lists 
factors, reminiscent of those from Justice Story, which judges may take into 
consideration to determine if the facts of a case warrant a fair use defense.25   
                                                          
15 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 345-46. 
18 Id. at 345-49 (finding a ‘piracy,’ which is equated with modern day copyright infringement, and 
that the affirmative defense brought by the defendant fell short in this case, a defense later known 
as the fair use defense). 
19 Id. at 348 (“Look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”). 
20 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348; see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 1992). 
21 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-80; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1106-07, 1110-12 (1990) (explaining how judges have applied fair use despite the lack of 
guidance given by the codification in section 107, and how he believes Judge Story’s four factors from 
Folsom should be applied). 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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The Congressional notes accompanying the statute show that it is difficult to 
distinguish between fair use and copyright infringement.26  Although the courts 
have analyzed and ruled on the fair use defense numerous times, its codification is 
the first unified attempt at defining it.27  Even with the codification, there is no 
general definition to apply since fair use must be decided on a case-by-case basis.28  
The legislative notes show that the purpose of the statute is to merely codify judicial 
interpretation of the defense up until that point, not modify or enlarge the concept 
in any way.29  It is meant to be open to further judicial interpretation and be a 
starting point for a judge’s analysis.30 
In the years following its codification, Section 107’s open-ended application 
provided too little guidance for judges on how to recognize fair use and what extent 
of copying is acceptable.31  In 1990, Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit 
published a law review article advocating for a fair use defense concept that is 
consistent with the principles of copyright.32  These principles include the 
utilitarian goal of stimulating progress of the arts for the intellectual improvement 
of the public rather than giving the absolute ownership of a work to an author.33  A 
judge may do this by looking at the four statutory factors given and using them to 
analyze the facts of each case while considering whether a finding of fair use would 
affect the objectives of copyright.34 
The most important point from Judge Leval’s article is his explanation of how 
a judge may analyze the first statutory factor, which considers the purpose and 
character of the secondary and allegedly infringing use.35  In order to determine this 
first factor, the secondary use must be analyzed to see if it is justified, and this 
justification hinges on whether the challenged secondary use is transformative or 
not.36  According to Judge Leval the first factor is the heart of the fair use defense, 
while the other factors focus on the entitlements of the copyright owner to be 
weighed against the first factor.37  Consideration of the purpose and character of 
use raises the question of whether the use is justified under the objectives of 
                                                          
26 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975). 
27 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975) (suggesting that judges 
have attempted to apply this defense with the factors for consideration that have emerged within 
each respective jurisdiction, with no previous statutory basis). 
28 Id. 
29 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62. 
30 Id. 
31 Leval, supra note. 21 at 1105-07. 
32 Id. at 1107 (advocating that fair use should become a “rational, integral part of copyright, whose 
observance is necessary to achieve the objectives of that law”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1110-11. 
35 Id. at 1111-12. 
36 Id. (defining a transformative use as one that is “productive and … employ[s] the quoted matter in 
a different manner or for a different purpose from the original”). 
37 Leval, supra note. 21 at 1116. 
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copyright law.38 If justifiable, it must be powerful enough to outweigh the rights of 
the copyright owner by transforming the original work.39  This transformative use 
must add value to the original work, rather than repackaging or republishing 
quotations from the original material.40 Since this factor is indispensable to a fair 
use defense, if a justification through transformative use is not found, then fair use 
should be rejected without further analysis of the other factors.41 
Judge Leval advocated successfully for this utilitarian transformative use 
approach, as it was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.42  Here, the defendants wrote a commercial parody of 
plaintiff’s song and the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the alleged 
infringement.43  In its consideration and analysis of the issue, the Court heavily 
relied on Judge Leval’s idea of transformative use and how it lies at the heart of the 
fair use doctrine.44  The Court held that this specific parody did not copy excessively 
from the original, and its criticism of an earlier era was transformative.45  In 
adopting Judge Leval’s take on the application of the four factors listed in Section 
107, the Court expanded the transformative use concept to a new class of 
copyrighted works to include pictures, sculptures and music.46 
This Supreme Court decision acknowledges the importance of the first 
statutory factor in Section 107 to the fair use defense.47  Following this decision, 
other courts began to expand this application without considering, as Judge Leval 
cautioned, the core objectives of copyright law.48  This expansion began in the Ninth 
Circuit.49 
                                                          
38 Leval, supra note. 21 at 1116. 
39 Id. at 1111-12. 
40 Id. (noting that transformative uses when proven do not necessarily guarantee a successful fair 
use defense, especially if extensive taking from an original work imposes on the incentives for 
authors to create). 
41 Id. at 1116. 
42 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
43 Id. at 571-73 (defendant 2 Live Crew wrote a commercial parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” owned by plaintiff Acuff-Rose Music Inc. and the Court was to decide if it was either 
infringement or fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
44 Id. at 578-79 (“The more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors … that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
45 Id. at 578-85. 
46 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-85. 
47 Id. at 578. 
48 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 811 (applying the fair use defense to an Internet search engine considering the 
transformative use and public good, unbalancing the rights of the authors and creators at the core of 
copyright objectives); Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1146 (applying the fair use defense to Google and 
Amazon again putting the transformative use that serves the public good over the rights of the 
copyright owners). 
49 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163-68. 
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B. Transformations Rewarding the Public Over Authors 
The Ninth Circuit is well known for tackling issues of advancing technology 
in copyright contexts.50  The results of considering these sorts of issues do not 
always retain the core concepts of copyright law, which is to advance public intellect 
for the exchange of return on investment by creative authors willing to share their 
works.51  This is illustrated through the Circuit’s decisions in the Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp. and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc. cases.52 
Arriba Soft is a search engine that displays results as small pictures, or 
‘thumbnails,’ instead of displaying text; Kelly, a photographer, realized that his 
images displaying scenes of the American West were part of Arriba Soft’s database, 
and sued for infringement.53  In 2006, the court in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. found 
that while the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s photographs was commercial in 
nature, it was more incidental than exploitative.54  The court also found that 
changing the full-size photographs into smaller, lower-resolution images constituted 
a transformative use from the originals by providing access to images on the 
Internet and their websites, as opposed to the aesthetic function of the original 
photographs.  The court saw this transformation as a change in function from the 
original work to the infringing use, rather than the “retransmission of … images in 
a different medium,” simply because this change served the purpose of improving 
access to information on the Internet rather than artistic expression.55  After 
considering the other three factors of Section 107, the court concluded that since a 
majority of the factors favored Arriba Soft, the use of the thumbnails should be 
considered a fair use.56 
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit again considered a fair use claim with very similar 
facts to Kelly.57  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc, in which Google was a co-
defendant, had facts and a fair use defense analysis that was very similar to Kelly.58  
The court found that Google’s use of the thumbnails was highly transformative 
because they serve a different function than the original work’s aesthetic or 
entertainment purpose.59  Google was found to have improved access to information 
                                                          
50 See generally Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146 (applying the fair use defense to 
copyrighted photographs on the internet that were allegedly infringed upon by an online search 
engine). 
51 See Leval, supra note 21, at 1107. 
52 See Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146. 
53 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816-19. 
54 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816-19. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 822. 
57 See generally Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146. 
58 Id. at 1155-57, 1163-68 (stating that Google was using thumbnail versions of full pictures from the 
Perfect 10 website, a site offering nude photos to those willing to pay to be part of the “member’s 
area”). 
59 Id. at 1163-68; See also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. 
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on the Internet, a use that the court found to be new, different, and transformative 
from Perfect 10’s original use for the photographs.60 
Changing the theory of transformative use to give so much deference to 
public enrichment over rewarding the authors goes beyond the guidance provided 
by the statute in Section 107.61  The Supreme Court advocated for this change, so 
long as it was done within the purposes of copyright, and also stated that lower 
courts may lessen the weight of consideration of the last three factors so long as the 
first factor is found through a transformative use.62  The Ninth Circuit takes this 
one step further by looking to the great public service provided by these two similar 
cases in terms of search engine functionality and accessibility, and how 
transformative the use is without seeming to consider the other Section 107 factors 
Judge Leval advised would protect the interests of the copyright owner.63  This shift 
puts more emphasis on the needs of the public over the need to incentivize new 
authors and creators to continue creating, unbalancing one of the core purposes of 
copyright.64 
C. Transforming Fair Use to Serve the Public: Google and HathiTrust 
The Ninth Circuit is no longer one of the only Circuits to apply the 
transformative use concept to the fair use defense by favoring vast public 
enrichment over rights of authors.  Two recent cases out of the Southern District of 
New York in the Second Circuit have fully embraced this concept relating to the 
Google Books Project.65 
The Author’s Guild, a professional organization and advocate for writers, 
brought suit against Google in late 2005 for its creation of the Google Books Project 
and litigation continued through November of 2013.66  Google partnered with 
academic libraries to create a large electronic database in which both copyrighted 
books and books in the public domain are keyword-searchable and available in a 
digital format.67  In Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Judge Chin found that 
Google could exercise a fair use defense, relying heavily on Judge Leval’s article, the 
ruling from the Supreme Court in Campbell, and the more recent Ninth Circuit 
                                                          
60 See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (going so far as to say that the search engine may have more 
transformative use than the parody considered by the Supreme Court in Campbell). 
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see generally Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146. 
62 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
63 See Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; see also Leval, supra note 24, at 1110-11, 1116-
25. 
64 Leval, supra note 21, at 1106-07.  
65 See generally HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445; Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282. 
66 See generally Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (The history of this case between 2005 and 2011 
concerned the two parties negotiating a settlement, which was denied by the Southern District of 
New York. Following the denial, a new class-action suit was filed and recently decided in November 
2013.). 
67 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
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precedent regarding fair use.68  While there was an abundance of evidence pointing 
to a prima facie case of copyright infringement by Google, it did not matter because 
Google’s use of the copyrighted works was highly transformative.  The court held 
that Google changed “expressive text into a comprehensive word index that helps 
readers, scholars, researchers, and others find books” and did not supersede the text 
of the books.69 
When taking into account the other factors, Judge Chin found that there 
were not many convincing arguments made in favor of Author’s Guild, save for the 
factor that considers the amount of the original work that is copied.70  When 
considered overall, Judge Chin concluded that Google Books benefits both the public 
and the authors and publishers. He therefore found a fair use defense in this case 
would be in line with the principles of copyright.71 
In a separate case with similar facts, Author’s Guild brought suit against 
HathiTrust in 2011, a partnership of major academic research libraries founded in 
2008, an offshoot of the Google Books Project.72  The main difference between this 
case and the Google Books case is that HathiTrust is a group of libraries, and their 
use of the material is presumed to be for nonprofit purposes rather than commercial 
use.73 
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust was decided in October 2012, a little 
earlier than the main Google Books case.74  Relying on Campbell and the work of 
Judge Leval, Judge Baer found that the first factor of Section 107 was satisfied in 
its purpose for scholars and academic research, by protecting those works that still 
have valid copyrights from being read in full without purchase, and under 
transformative use, because the new purpose of the copied works was enhanced by 
search capabilities of the text.75  After evaluating the other three factors and 
concluding that transformative use undermined any favorable factors to the 
Author’s Guild without a transformative use, Judge Baer ruled that HathiTrust 
served the purposes of copyright to allow the fair use defense to apply in this case.76 
These two cases show the rapid adoption of the first factor of Section 107, and 
that if a transformative use is found, that use will determine whether or not a fair 
                                                          
68 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 291-92 (stating that all books were scanned and reproduced in their entirety, which would 
normally be concerning, but since Google needed full verbatim scans of the books in order to offer a 
full-text search of the books, Judge Chin found this to balance the harm of the taking). 
71 Id. at 294. 
72 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
73 See generally HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459; see 17 U.S.C. §107(1) (“factors to be considered 
shall include - within the purpose and character of the use, whether or not a use is commercial in 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”). 
74 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 445. 
75 Id. at 459-61. 
76 Id. at 461-64. 
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use defense applies in a given case.77  Starting with Judge Leval and the adoption of 
his theory by the Supreme Court, then expanding from the Ninth Circuit into the 
Second Circuit, this theory is likely to change how fair use is applied from pre-
codification precedent and from how the statute suggests it should be applied. 
 
D. Statutory Construction of Section 107: The Basics 
 
The processes of legislative drafting and analysis of statutory language overlap 
when deciding how to draft new legislation or how to properly interpret codified 
language.78  Central to these processes are the canons of statutory principles 
applied by judges when reading and interpreting a statute and considered by 
legislators when drafting new legislation.79   
These canons are extremely important to keep in mind when interpreting the 
meaning of any statute, especially in the case of the fair use defense.80  The 
codification in the 1976 Copyright Act of the defense was meant to condense 
decades of judicial consideration and countless different interpretations into one 
concept for judicial application across jurisdictions.81   
 
III. STATUTORY MISCONSTRUCTION: THE PROPAGATION OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE 
 
The current track of the fair use defense, especially following the decisions in 
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., is 
straying too far from the common statutory interpretation canons or principles.82  
This section will analyze the traditional statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. § 107 
and how Congress intended this defense to be applied based on the language itself 
and the legislative history of the section’s drafting.  This section will then apply this 
statutory construction to the Author’s Guild cases and show how each decision’s 
extension of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of fair use deviates from the 
traditional statutory construction of the fair use defense. 
                                                          
77 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-61; see also Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 578 (adopting Judge Leval’s view of emphasizing the first factor of section 107 more than the 
other three, if a ‘transformative use’ justification can be found). 
78 See generally Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (last updated Aug. 31, 2008); Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision & the Rules or Canons About How Statutes 
Are to be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1949). 
79 See Kim, supra note 78, at 1-2; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06. 
80 See Kim, supra note 78, at 1-2; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06. 
81 See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976). 
82 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-61. 
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A. The Codification of Fair Use: Restating Common Law 
Section 107 was created intending to restate the judicial doctrine of the fair 
use defense at the time that the statute was adopted.83  This codification includes a 
preamble generally explaining the defense, four factors that judges are urged to 
consider among others when analyzing a case for fair use, and a caveat regarding 
the place of unpublished works within the defense.84  A traditional statutory 
construction analysis considers many of the canons and any judge interpreting the 
meaning of this statute, and how fair use applies to an individual case, should 
consider these canons as well.85 
Statutory construction based on the traditional canons emphasizes 
starting and ending any analysis with the plain language of the statute, 
especially if that language is unambiguous.86  This means that if the 
language provided can plainly be discerned, then there is no need to turn to 
the legislative history or Congressional intent for further guidance.87  
However, if a statute is ambiguously written, or a literal reading would 
create absurd results, it is common for courts to then look to the legislative 
history of a document to garner further information on how Congress 
intended the statute to be interpreted.88 
For Section 107, the language is unambiguous, even if the application is more 
difficult to understand.89  It states that notwithstanding the provisions of sections of 
the Act that note the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners, fair use of a 
specific copyrighted work for the purposes enumerated is not considered to be an 
infringement of that copyright.  These purposes include “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research.”90  The statute then lists four guiding factors that shall be included in any 
analysis determining if an infringing use may be afforded a fair use defense, which 
include:  the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
the amount of the portion used in relation to the whole, and the effect of the use 
upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work.91  Finally, the statute 
ends with a caveat that just because a work is unpublished, that alone will not bar a 
finding of fair use if a finding can be made based on the four listed factors.92  To 
                                                          
83 See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
84 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
85 See Kim, supra note 78, at 1-2; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06. 
86 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403. 
87 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2. 
88 See Kim supra note 78, at 2-4; See also Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403 (giving the counter point 
to the plain and unambiguous canon that it should not be read as being plain and unambiguous 
“when literal interpretation would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart manifest 
purpose”). 
89 See Leval, supra note 21, at 1105-06. 
90 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
91 Id. at § 107(1)-(4). 
92 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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summarize, a plain reading of the statute would say that fair use of a copyrighted 
work for specific purposes will not be infringement and that the four factors should 
be used in making that determination.93 
The language itself gives no indication as to which of the factors, if 
any, should weigh more in the analysis.  This means all factors should be 
considered without deference to a specific one.94  A plain reading would also 
support that due to the subjective nature of the factors, every case 
attempting to bring a fair use defense needs to be decided on its own 
particular fact pattern because there is no bright-line standard for deciding if 
something is considered a fair use.95  There are some things that may be 
inferred based on specific words used within the statute.96  One example is 
that because the words “shall include” are used prior to describing the factors 
for consideration, all four factors should be considered by judges in their 
analyses, but these are not the only factors that may be considered.97  
Another example is that because the words “such as” are used before the list 
of acceptable purposes that may bring a successful fair use defense, it may be 
inferred that there are other possible acceptable purposes and that the list 
provided is non-exhaustive.98   
Considering that the language as interpreted above is unambiguous, 
and would not lead to absurd results due to its success in American common 
law for decades prior to codification, this would be a good reading of the 
language of the statute.99  However, because the guidance given in Section 
107 is so difficult to apply, despite being plainly stated, a judge would want to 
look to legislative history for further guidance.100  While this is always a valid 
option, the legislative history merely spells out what is obvious from a plain 
reading of this statute itself.101  The history shows that courts are free to 
                                                          
93 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.; Accord S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
96 See Kim, supra note 78, at 6-7 (explaining that words that are not defined within the statute or are 
not terms of art are given their ordinary, dictionary definitions); Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 302 
(enumerating the canon of statutory construction that claims that words are to be taken in their 
ordinary meaning unless they are technical or terms of art). 
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see generally Kim, supra note 78; Llewellyn, supra note 78. 
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
99 See Kim, supra note 78, at 6-7; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403 (noting that the counterpoints to 
the traditional statutory construction canons of plain language and ordinary meaning do not really 
apply in a situation where those interpretation do not cause absurd results that fall outside the 
purposes of the statute). 
100 See Leval, supra note 78, at 1105-06; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403 (noting the counter point to 
having plainly stated text is to look to the legislative history for overall meaning of the statute). 
Contra Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3 (explaining that the current trend of the Supreme Court is to 
begin and end analysis of statutes with their plain meaning if discernible, rather than resorting to 
legislative history). 
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
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adapt the doctrine on a case-by-case basis, and that Section 107 was intended 
to restate the judicial doctrine of fair use as it was developed prior to 
codification, rather than change, narrow, or enlarge the doctrine in any 
way.102  This is all consistent with a traditional statutory construction 
analysis.103 
Another traditional statutory construction principle is that a statute 
should be read as a whole, where each section within is interpreted in a 
broader statutory context to further the overall purposes of the statute.104  In 
the context of the Copyright Act, the statute itself fulfills the part of the 
United States Constitution that designates the right to Congress to create 
copyright laws.105  The Constitution states that Congress has the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”106  This means that all copyright laws should be 
written and interpreted with the broad purpose in mind that authors are 
rewarded for sharing their creativity with the public by having a limited 
monopoly over exclusive rights that go with the work, such as reproducing 
and distributing the work.107  It is a balance between benefitting the public 
intellectually and rewarding the work and creativity of the authors.108 
Section 107 should be read with this general purpose in mind, which is often 
acknowledged in opinions where judges are considering the fair use 
defense.109  It is important to analyze the defense and the four factors listed 
in Section 107 in a context that satisfies the core principles of copyright, 
namely the balance mentioned above.110 Two important canons of statutory 
construction that play off each other are the idea that every word and clause 
of a statute must be given effect and that the courts should not add language 
that Congress has not included.111  Statutes should not be construed to 
                                                          
102 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
103 See generally Kim, supra note 78; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06. 
104 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3 (“A statute should be read as a harmonious whole, with its various 
parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory 
purposes.”); Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 302 (including the canon that statutes in pari materia, or on 
the same subject or matter, must be construed together). 
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.; see Leval, supra note 21, at 1107-08; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing examples of exclusive 
rights granted to a copyright owner upon the granting of a copyright for a work, including right to 
make and distribute copies, right to public display, right to sound recordings, etc.). 
108 Leval, supra note 21, at 1107-08. 
109 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-78. 
110 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-78 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one 
from another.  All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright.”); Leval, supra note 21, at 1110-11. 
111 See Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
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render superfluous any of the language included.112  Similarly, Congress put 
time and effort into creating a statute and going further to amend it, so the 
courts should be wary of including and making crucial any new language to 
the statute.113  This prevents judges from undermining the authority of 
Congress and interpreting the laws as they were written, allowing for respect 
of the drafting process of Congress itself for choosing certain language.  A 
counterargument to this may be that the general rule is contrary to a very 
prominent and evident meaning that judges feel should be applied, and that 
judges should be given the leeway to interpret as they see fit to the particular 
situation in a case.114 
Section 107 should include all four factors, even if they are not to be 
weighed equally by a judge during his or her consideration of a case’s 
individual fair use defense.115  Also, a judge should not add language to what 
is already given, and, in the case of Section 107, that would mean an 
additional factor that must always be considered or an additional 
consideration within a specific factor.116  To commit either one of these 
actions not only goes against traditional statutory construction principles, 
but also against the common law foundations of the fair use defense.117 
Similarly, another traditional canon is that words and phrases that 
have received judicial construction before enactment should be understood 
according to that construction.118  The fair use defense is based off of judicial 
constructs beginning with those factors and concepts enumerated in Folsom 
v. Marsh.119  The statute and legislative history state that all factors should 
be considered on a case-by-case basis and provide a list of factors that would 
be most useful to the majority of analyses.120  These basic concepts were used 
in the common law for decades before being codified.  Therefore, in the case of 
Section 107, the codified construction is what judges should use in their 
analyses.121 
There are many other canons of statutory construction that may be 
                                                          
112 See Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13 (citing Monclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)) (“A basic 
principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and 
word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was 
ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’); Llewellyn, supra note 80, at 404. 
113 See Kim, supra note 78, at 13. 
114 See Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
116 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13. 
117 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404; S. REP. NO. 94-
473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
118 See generally Kim, supra note 78, at 18 (explaining that if Congress wanted to depart from an 
established interpretation at common law, it would make it clear not only in the statute but also in 
its legislative history); see also Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401. 
119 17 U.S.C. § 107. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. 
120 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
121 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
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observed and applied to Section 107, but do not add substantially more to 
what has already been discussed.122  While this statutory construction is 
based on a hypothetical reading of the fair use defense, it, like the defense 
itself, comes to life when applied to a case’s fact pattern. 
 
IV. GOOGLE AND HATHITRUST IGNORE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
 
Traditional statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. § 107 lends most 
credence to a plain reading of the statute supplemented by the legislative 
intent.123  What is clear from the precedent set in the Ninth Circuit with 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., and the 
expansion of that precedent in New York’s Southern District through 
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., is 
that the courts are beginning to move away from the traditional statutory 
construction of Section 107 by focusing heavily on transformative use.124  By 
moving away from this construction, in essence, the Second and Ninth 
Circuits are moving away from decades of judicial construction of the fair use 
defense that Section 107 was meant to codify.125  The Author’s Guild cases 
use the crutches of increased technology and large public benefits to avoid 
applying the traditional statutory construction to achieve a particular 
result.126  This comes at the cost of the individual authors and publishing 
companies retaining profits for their creativity and creates a lack of incentive, 
all while under the guise of being “in light of the purposes of copyright.”127  
The following contains specific examples of how this focuses on the first factor 
listed in Section 107, and is based solely on whether an infringing use is 
transformative or not, that strays away from the traditional statutory 
construction of the section. 
The most obvious canons that are violated here, and that can be considered 
an overarching theme for other statutory construction principles that are ignored, 
are that a statute must be analyzed by its plain language and that a statute must 
be read as a whole with each section striving to achieve an overall purpose.128 
                                                          
122 See Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06. 
123 Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403. 
124 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 290-92; Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 
459-60; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163. 
125 17 U.S.C. § 107; see S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66; Leval, supra note. 
24, at 1106-07, 1111-12; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
126 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92; HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 458-64 (finding in both cases 
that the benefit to the public in general, and the print-disabled public in particular, makes the 
complete copying of the books and articles a transformative use to a keyword-searchable book 
database). 
127 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
128 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 402-03. 
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Both HathiTrust and Google ignore the plain language reading of Section 107 
by giving almost all consideration to the first factor and relating back the other 
three to the fact that the first factor has been found.129  In both HathiTrust and 
Google, Judges Baer and Chin, after finding that the infringing use was 
transformative and therefore satisfied the first factor of Section 107, referred back 
to the first factor and the transformative use when setting out their brief analyses 
of the other three factors in each case.130  The plain reading of the statute infers 
that each factor should be considered fully and then considered overall to determine 
if a fair use defense exists.131  While the judge determines the weight each factor 
should be given in the analysis, including those factors the judge wishes to consider 
not enumerated in the statute, it is logical to believe that each factor deserves its 
own careful contemplation.132 
Both cases also ignore the overall purpose of the Copyright Act.133  While 
Judge Chin specifically mentions that he believes all parties benefit in some way 
from the Google Books database, he glosses over the harms suffered by the 
individual authors and publishing companies.134  Google took thousands of books, 
digitized them, kept copies for itself, distributed them in snippets to the public, in 
full text back to the libraries, all without payment of any kind to the copyright 
holders.135  While this enriches the intellect of the public, it woefully ignores the 
rights of the authors and publishers who suffered unauthorized copying and 
distributions of their copyrighted works.136  
Another canon of statutory construction that both cases disregard is that 
every word and clause of a statute must be given effect.137  As discussed above, 
Google and HathiTrust put the most emphasis on finding the first factor, with a 
determination that a transformative use exists without the other three factors of 
Section 107.138  This makes the other three factors, forged in the common law and 
then codified to reflect that judicial construction, mere surplusage.139  It implies 
that Congress did not need to bother including the other three factors if courts 
today only feel the need to briefly run through them once determining there was a 
transformative use.140   
More specifically to HathiTrust, there is another section of the Copyright Act, 
17 U.S.C. § 108, that deals with the exceptions to copyright infringement pertaining 
                                                          
129 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 6-11; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-64. 
130 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 6-11; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-64. 
131 17 U.S.C. § 107; Kim, supra note 80 at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 80 at 403. 
132 17 U.S.C. § 107.  See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
133 Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 402-03. 
134 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 293-94. 
135 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 293-94. 
136 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
137 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
138 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 290-92; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-64. 
139 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
140 17 U.S.C. § 107; Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
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to libraries.141  As written, Section 108 gives leeway to fair use defenses if Section 
107 is not found to apply, but the fact that Judge Baer completely waived off the 
argument that Section 108 applied without considering it further almost renders 
Section 108 as surplusage.142  If Section 108 never applies because Section 107 
supersedes it, even when the allegedly infringing party is a library, no library will 
ever feel the need to use the protections afforded under Section 108 if they may 
obtain a defense more easily from Section 107.143 
More specifically to Google, Judge Chin disregards the commercial nature of 
Google, thus disregarding that an activity having a commercial character, while not 
dispositive, needs to be weighed with the other factors in the overall 
consideration.144  Judge Chin dismisses the commercial purpose of the activity by 
saying that Google only indirectly profited from the Google Books project and does 
not weigh that consideration with the others.145  While it is a hard line to draw, 
Congress would not have specifically included a provision that a judge should 
consider the commercial, not-for-profit, or educational character of the use, if it was 
not meant to factor into the overall analysis.  Otherwise, those words would be 
surplusage.146 
The canon that is often considered with surplusage, that the courts should 
not add something where Congress has not, also applies to the analysis employed in 
both Author’s Guild cases.147  Both cases added the concept of the transformative 
use to the first factor in Section 107.148  Congress amended the language from “the 
purpose and character of the use” to the language as it currently stands, explicitly 
adding, “whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational 
purposes.”149  There have also been amendments to Section 107 in 1990 and 1992, 
and further amendments to the Copyright Act in 1998.150  There was ample time for 
Congress to consider the ruling of the Supreme Court in Campbell and its adoption 
of Judge Leval’s transformative use in light of the rise of new technology; however, 
Congress chose to keep the language as it was.151  If Congress wanted 
transformative use to be the cornerstone of the fair use defense, Congress could 
                                                          
141 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (stating the affirmative defense that libraries may use when a suit for 
infringement of the exclusive rights of making and distributing copies within the libraries of 
copyrighted works, and in what situations that defense applies). 
142 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 456-58; see also 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4); Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; 
Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
143 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
144 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d. at 291-92; see S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 
(explaining in both legislative histories that all factors need to be weighed somehow in a fair use 
analysis). 
145 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92. 
146 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404. 
147 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401. 
148 HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 459-61; Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92. 
149 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
150 Id. 
151 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
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have made it so, and for the courts to continue to disregard this and add to Section 
107 goes against traditional statutory construction principles.152   
Finally, the fair use defense received considerable judicial construction before 
the codification of Section 107.153  Understanding a statute in light of that common 
law construction is another canon of traditional statutory construction.154  
Beginning with Folsom v. Marsh and continuing through the years, Section 107 is 
meant to be simply a restatement of all case law that led up to the 1976 Copyright 
Act regarding the fair use defense.155  Each application is to be considered on a case-
by-case basis and to be analyzed with at least the four factors enumerated within 
Section 107, because that was the judicial construction of the fair use defense prior 
to codification.156  It was only in the last twenty or so years with Judge Leval and 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell, as well as the rapid expansion of the 
concept by the Ninth Circuit, that transformative use has started to gain judicial 
popularity.157  Both Google and HathiTrust rely heavily on the post-codification 
construction of the fair use defense that involves transformative use, which is a far 
cry from the way judges traditionally interpreted the statute.158 
Though these are not the only examples of traditional statutory construction 
principles that could be applied to these cases, it is clear from this analysis that the 
adoption of transformative use truly transforms how the fair use defense is 
applied.159  It is hard to tell if there will be future expansion of this post-codification 
construction of Section 107, but what is certain is that it is now too far from the way 
it should be read by judges and others.160   
 
V. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL EXPANSION: SOLUTIONS TO A FAIR USE FAUX PAS 
 
The Southern District of New York’s application of the fair use principle, 
especially its application of the transformative use doctrine, is not something that is 
accepted across the board and may generate litigation in other jurisdictions over the 
same issues with varied results.  It is clear from this that a clarification of the parts 
of the Copyright Act that deal directly with the fair use defense would provide the 
necessary guidance for correct application of the defense.  This clarification may 
come from one of two sources: either the Supreme Court or Congress. 
                                                          
152 See Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401, 404. 
153 See generally Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342. 
154 Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401. 
155 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
156 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
157 Leval, supra note 21, at 1111-12; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Perfect 10, 
508 F.3d at 1163. 
158 Leval, supra note 21, at 1111-12; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Perfect 10, 
508 F.3d at 1163. 
159 See generally Llewellyn, supra note 78. 
160 Id. at 401-06. 
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The first option would require a case attempting to interpret how the fair use 
defense applies and the role of the doctrine of transformative use, to be accepted on 
appeal to the Supreme Court.  Both the HathiTrust and Google decisions are 
appealable and could possibly escalate to the Second Circuit, and further petitioned 
to the Supreme Court.  It is possible that there is ample case law in other Circuits 
that could be appealed as well.  A recommendation would be for the Supreme Court 
to conduct a statutory construction analysis to determine how far the fair use 
defense, and other judicial constructs like transformative use, may go in terms of 
favoring the public over the authors.  A true reading of the statute based on the 
canons of statutory construction would give credence to an interpretation that 
current case law is going too far from the purpose of the fair use defense and the 
overall purpose of the Copyright Act.161  The Ninth Circuit and Southern District of 
New York’s decisions upset the balance that is inherent in the Copyright Clause of 
the Constitution and the Copyright Act, and that is struck between the needs of the 
public and the need to provide incentive to authors and creators by favoring the 
public benefit.162  A Supreme Court decision would provide a clear and uniform 
interpretation of the fair use defense to apply across the Circuits, limiting extensive 
future litigation costs and further confusion regarding Section 107. 
The Supreme Court may also be able to combine sections in the Copyright 
Act.  If the Court were to analyze and interpret the relationship between Section 
107 and Section108, then library exception cases such as the Author’s Guild cases 
would be easier to decide.163  As it is currently written, Section 108 provides an 
affirmative defense to copyright infringement on the exclusive right of reproduction 
so long as the infringer is a library or archive, and only a certain number of copies 
are reproduced for specific purposes.164  This section was updated to include a 
defense for digitization of works, but only for purposes of preservation of, or ease of 
access to, the work.165  However, the section carves out the fair use defense by 
stating “nothing in this section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided 
by Section 107.”166  In light of new technological advances showcased in the Author’s 
Guild cases, in particular the HathiTrust decision, the most recent amendment to 
Section 108 is outdated technologically, shifts a court’s analysis to section 107, and 
fails to utilize Section 108.167  A Supreme Court decision consistent with 
technological advances that helps to clarify how the two defenses work together 
would be a good solution to the current problem.   
                                                          
161 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107; Llewellyn, supra note 80, at 401-06. 
162 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 293-94; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; 
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163. 
163 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-61; see generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108 (stating that section 
108 is not meant to interfere with any rights or defenses provided in section 107 as currently 
written). 
164 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
165 Id. § 108(b)(2), (c)(2). 
166 Id. § 108(f)(4). 
167 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-61. 
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Another option would be one of several legislative solutions, which include 
amending the current Copyright Act and clarifying Section 107, Section 108, or 
both, to allow for a clearer application of the fair use defense to internet-based 
works.  This option, regardless of what sections are amended, is more likely than 
consideration by the Supreme Court. 
An amendment to Section 107 should consider the current language before 
and after the four factors enumerated for judicial consideration.168  Language that 
would be most effective in clarifying the present problems with the interpretation of 
the fair use defense would have to explain how much weight should be given to any 
one factor listed in the statute for consideration, and may even include an 
acceptable interpretation of transformative use.169  An amendment to Section 108 
would need to be directed at the amount of copies and the purposes for which a 
library may digitize copyrighted works within its collection.170  This would address 
cases like HathiTrust more directly, and if amended in a way that considers the 
advancement of technology where digitization is concerned, Section 108 could be 
properly used in conjunction with the fair use defense.171  An amendment to both 
sections would allow for cases like the Author’s Guild decisions to be analyzed and 
ruled on with no doubt as to the Congressional intent behind the statute and how it 
should be applied in situations with commercial entities in opposition to nonprofit 
libraries. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
It is unclear from the most recent opinions in Author’s Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., whether any issues will be 
appealed and whether the courts will consider this issue of transformative use 
within the scope of the fair use defense.  The question remains whether these recent 
changes signify a permanent shift in the state of this area of copyright law or if they 
are merely a fluke that will be corrected by any or all of the recommendations listed 
above. This interpretation does not comply with traditional statutory construction 
principles. It is discomforting that both the established case law and more recent 
developing precedent only 25 years after codification, can rapidly change without 
Congressional input as to the original intent of the Act. One can only hope that 
some sort of solution in the form of Congressional or Supreme Court intervention 
will arrive to clear up and refocus the appropriate construction for Section 10.
                                                          
168 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
169 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66. 
170 17 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2), (c)(2). 
171 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 456-58. 
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Abstract 
 
“[Y]our tranny looking dad is a disgrace to American football,” “I would rape 
the shit out of her,” and “[The] [B]ears are easier than you on prom night,”1 are just 
a sampling of some of the alarmingly harassing tweets received by Chloe Trestman 
between the night of November 9, 2014 and November 10, 2014. Who is Chloe 
Trestman, and what could she have possibly done to warrant such abuse? Chloe’s 
father is Marc Trestman, the head coach of the Chicago Bears. And the twitter 
vitriol, or “twitriol,” directed toward Chloe was in response to the Bears’ blowout 
loss to their longtime rivals, the Green Bay Packers, 55-14 on Sunday Night 
Football. So the question remains, what did Chloe do to garner such an abusive 
reaction from the disgruntled Chicago fan-base?  
The answer, of course, is she did nothing to deserve this hate-inspired 
tweeter tirade, other than being the daughter of an NFL head coach and having a 
twitter account. In this generation of Facebook, Twitter and other social media 
outlets, it is commonplace for athletes, and unfortunately sometimes their family 
members, to become targets of harassing online misconduct and abuse. Arguably 
more alarming than the harassing component of social media websites, is the fact 
that the current laws governing Internet Service Providers lack the necessary teeth 
to provide any recourse to athletes victimized by online misconduct, which only 
perpetuates this type of behavior and leaves no recourse for the injured party. So 
Coach Trestman, Chloe Trestman and mostly any other internet targeted athlete 
are left with no legal remedy until the vast safeguards protecting ISPs are 
curtailed.   
  
                                                          
1 Samer Kalaf, Twitter Users Harass Marc Trestman's Daughters After Bears Loss, Deadspin (Nov. 
10, 2014), http://deadspin.com/twitter-users-harass-marc-trestmans-daughters-after-bea-
1657009542.  
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“The fact that broadcasters, media people and athletes are allowed to 
tweet, which should be against the law, is a big change, okay. It should 
be against the law, all right, because nobody needs to hear from any 
one of them.”2  
– Mike Francesa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Tom Weir, WFAN's Mike Francesa Wants to Make Twitter Illegal, USA TODAY (May 15, 2012), 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2012/05/wfans-mike-francesa-wants-to-make-
twitter-illegal/1#.UXhmTrVJOVV.  
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Legendary New York sports radio talk show host Mike Francesa is right in 
that athletic tweets can be problematic. Due to their celebrity status, athletes are 
easy targets for social media “trolls,” or people who regularly and anonymously post 
offensive insults on social media sites.3 While some of the negative content 
constitutes free speech, there are many instances when the third party’s conduct 
exceeds the First Amendment’s scope of protection, and quite often constitutes cyber 
harassment.4  
Few, if any, laws provide athletes with meaningful recourse. Under the 
current law, individual social media sites and other Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) are immune from liability for their users’ behavior by the legislative 
safeguards granted to ISPs through the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).5 As recent incidents illustrate, the 
consequences of athletic cyber harassment yield great damages.6 
 The consequence of damages is complicated by the anonymous nature of 
social media and the strong business presence of the sports industry in the United 
States and throughout the world. This makes athletes some of the most popular and 
influential people in the country, which renders them vulnerable targets for 
Internet misconduct by way of social media sites. Society’s iconography of athletes 
increases the potential for damages resulting from public humiliation via social 
media. According to a recent article by Lee Gordon, the Barna Group reports that, 
“Americans believe that professional athletes have a bigger influence on their lives 
than pastors by more than a three-to-one margin.”7 Just consider the 20.5 million 
Twitter followers of LeBron James to the 5.9 million followers of Pope Francis.8  
The combination of America’s infatuation with athletes and ease of fan-
athlete communication on social media can be volatile. Despite every effort that is 
made to limit athletes’ use of social media to avoid precarious situations that will 
reflect poorly on the athlete and the team, league or university, athletes still find 
themselves frequently in trouble due to their availability to the public on such sites 
                                                          
3 Erik Brady & Jorge L. Ortiz, For Athletes, Social Media Not All Fun and Games, USA TODAY (July 
31, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2013/07/31/for-athletes-social-media-not-all-fun-
and-games/2606829/. 
4 Id. (example of how tennis professional and “U.S. Fed Cup team member Varvara Lepchenko found 
a message on her Facebook page at Wimbledon telling her that if she didn't lose her first-round 
match in London she wouldn't live”). 
5 Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 
512 (2012). 
6 See infra Part I (the Manti Te’o and Randall Goforth situations discussed within this article). 
7 Lee Gordon, Think Before You Tweet: Social Media Lessons for Athletes, STACK (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://www.stack.com/2013/02/22/twitter-for-athletes. 
8 @KingJames, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/KingJames (last visited April 19, 2015); @Pontifex, 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Pontifex/followers (last visited April 19, 2015). 
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as Facebook and Twitter. Under the current set of laws, there is no remedy for 
athletes victimized through social media misconduct. 
This article will highlight the vulnerability of national athletes through their 
use of social media and will discuss the lack of remedies available due to the 
legislative and judicial confines of Free Speech and the current applicable laws. The 
article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a narrative of two recent social media 
debacles: the Manti Te’o catfishing controversy and the Randall Goforth fake 
Twitter account prank. This section uses the Te’o and Goforth situations to 
illustrate how high profile athletes can become victims of Internet misconduct 
through the use of social media.  
Part II outlines the current safeguards that prevent Te’o, Goforth and other 
similarly situated athletes from recovering damages suffered through social media 
sites or other ISPs. Specifically, this section will address the immunities granted to 
ISPs through the CDA, the DMCA, and explain how the Supreme Court and other 
federal courts have expanded Congressional immunity granted to ISPs. 
Part III analyzes the cyber harassment aspect of these two incidents, while 
Part IV describes the collective limitations of the CDA, the DMCA, and the current 
harassment laws as means to provide relief for online harassment. This last section 
illustrates the reason Te’o and Goforth are likely to fail should they proceed with 
their actions against Facebook and Twitter, respectively. This article concludes by 
arguing that the current laws do not offer adequate relief for Te’o, Goforth and other 
similarly situated athletes. In fact, these laws actually contribute to social media 
misconduct by immunizing social media sites from repercussions from this type of 
conduct.   
I. OPENING DRIVE: SOCIAL MEDIA’S NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ATHLETES 
 
Both the Manti Te’o fake girlfriend hoax, which broke in early January 2013, 
and the Randall Goforth fake Twitter account incident, which occurred at the end of 
the 2012 NCAA football season, illustrate how social media sites can make athletes, 
through little or no fault of their own, easy targets for harmful online activity. 
Although the specific details differ, both cases share the important similarities of 
garnering an incredible amount of media coverage and displaying the dangerous 
side of social media for athletes. Both instances serve as examples that support the 
need for accountability of ISPs when social media leads to emotional injury, loss of 
anticipated business, and other possible damages. 
A. (Cat)fishing for Manti  
 Manti Te’o at 6’5” and 250lbs, was Notre Dame’s All-American inside 
linebacker who played in all 38 games during his four-year career and started in 36 
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of them, including 35 consecutive contests for the Fighting Irish.9 Te’o was one of 
the most highly regarded and most decorated defensive players, not only to come 
out of Notre Dame in recent years, but in college football history.10 Prior to January 
2013, his name was synonymous with winning, strong character, leadership, and 
potential.  
Te’o’s journey was one of the feel-good college stories emerging out of the 
2012 season. His exceptional play anchored the revitalized Notre Dame defense that 
paced the Fighting Irish to a 12-0 record, which earned the storied university a spot 
in the 2013 Bowl Championship Series title game to compete for its first National 
Championship since 1988.11 He was heralded for how well he was able to perform 
on the field after losing both his grandmother and his girlfriend, Lennay Kekua, 
who lost a battle to leukemia, within hours of each other during the season in 
September 2012.12 Te’o’s stellar play, coupled with his tragic personal loss, 
propelled him into the running for the Heisman Trophy, which is awarded by a vote 
to the most outstanding college player of the season. Although Te’o would finish 
second in the Heisman Trophy balloting, his professional career appeared to be 
bright as he was considered a highly touted prospect coming out of college and 
believed to be a high first round draft selection in the upcoming 2013 NFL Draft.13 
Te’o’s personal and professional life were both compromised, however, when the 
website Deadspin published an article stating that his late girlfriend never 
existed.14  
Notre Dame claimed in a statement that Te’o was a victim of an elaborate 
“hoax,” known as catfishing,15 in which someone used the fictitious name Lennay 
Kekua in order to establish a relationship with him and later conspired with others 
to convince Te’o that she had tragically died of leukemia.16 Te’o released a 
                                                          
9 Manti Te’o, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF NOTRE DAME’S ATHLETICS: FOOTBALL, 
http://www.und.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/teo_manti00.html (last visited May 2, 2013).  
10 Id. 
11 Manti Te’o-Biography, THE BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/manti-teo-
21105315?page=1 (last visited May 2, 2012) (hereinafter “Manti Te’o-Biography”). 
12 Steve Eder, Hoax Is Revealed as Irish Star Says He Was Duped, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/sports/ncaafootball/story-of-manti-teos-girlfriend-is-said-to-be-a-
hoax.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1367524036-s7Qzmj65fhVnlshsZd8BNA.  
13 Manti Te’o-Biography, supra note 11; see Matt Hayes, BCS National Championship Game: 
Alabama vs. Notre Dame Analysis, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2012-12-14/bcs-national-championship-game-2013-
alabama-vs-notre-dame-nick-saban. 
14 Eder, Hoax, supra note 12. 
15 See generally Mary Pilon, In Te’o Story, Deception Ripped from the Screen, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/sports/ncaafootball/deception-ripped-from-the-screen-in-
hoax-story-of-manti-teo.html?_r=0 
(explaining the origins of the “catfishing” phenomenon). 
16 Eder, Hoax, supra note 12. 
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statement of his own, admitting that he was the target of “what was apparently 
someone’s sick joke and constant lies.”17 But as more facts became public, the more 
twisted the story became, lending credence to what many media outlets’ labeled as, 
“one of the most bizarre stories to surface in the sports world in a long time.”18  
Despite the claims from Te’o and Notre Dame that depicted him as nothing 
more than a sympathetic victim in this peculiar story, some of the facts have left 
many questioning if he was a willing participant in this fraud, hoping that the 
tragic story would garner sympathy from the public and voters alike, in an effort to 
bolster his resume for the Heisman Trophy.19 On December 8, 2012 (two days after 
receiving the chilling call from Kekua’s phone, which left him questioning her death 
and identity), at the Heisman Trophy ceremony, Te’o stated that the most 
unforgettable moment of the 2012 season was the moment he found out his 
girlfriend had died.20 Although he has maintained his innocence in the hoax, Te’o 
did admit during his interview with ESPN that he tailored the story to lead people 
to believe that he had actually met Kekua in person before her death, out of 
embarrassment of people knowing it was strictly an online relationship.21  
From the time the rumblings surrounding the hoax began to surface at the 
end of December 2012, a downward spiral was set in motion for Te’o’s professional 
career.22 He had a poor performance in the BCS National Championship Game in 
early January 201323 and was later underwhelming at the 2013 NFL combine in 
Indianapolis.24 His misfortune continued in April 2013 when he was selected with 
                                                          
17 Eder, Hoax, supra note 12.  
18 Manti Te’o-Biography, supra note 11.  
19 Steve Eder, Image Becomes a Puzzle as Theories on Te’o Swirl, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/sports/ncaafootball/image-of-manti-teo-becomes-puzzle-as-
theories-swirl.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As.  
20 Eder, Te’o Answers Questions but Doesn’t Settle Riddle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/sports/ncaafootball/teos-espn-interview-has-answers-but-doesnt-
settle-riddle.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As&_r=0.  
21 Id. 
22 Eder, Te’o Answers, supra note 20. 
23 Tim Rohan, Te’o’s Draft Stock Tumbled When Irish Did, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/sports/ncaafootball/manti-teos-draft-stock-tumbled-when-irish-
did.html. 
24 Mike Florio, Te’o Blames Slow 40 Time on Combine Stress, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Feb. 25, 2013, 
9:21 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/02/25/teo-blames-slow-40-time-on-combine-stress 
(Te'o ran a 4.82-second 40-yard dash at the NFL scouting, which is considered slow for an NFL 
linebacker). 
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the thirty-eighth pick, the sixth pick of the second round and the third linebacker 
taken overall, in the 2013 NFL Draft.25  
Te’o, who entered the 2013 championship game as a highly regarded first 
round draft pick talent, dropped to the second round after his poor performance in 
the championship game and his sub-par forty time. Two team officials from 
different NFL clubs expressed to ESPN after the draft that their respective teams 
passed up on Te’o due to his “off the field issues” as well.26 It appears as though the 
fake girlfriend hoax not only embarrassed Te’o on a national level and tarnished his 
reputation, but it may have cost him the prestige and money that accompany a first 
round draft pick. Even Te’o was quoted as saying that he expected himself to be a 
first round draft pick, but he realized that “things happened” and vowed that his 
misfortunes would only give him more motivation going forward.27 The damage to 
Te’o’s reputation and professional career has already been done.  
B. Will @TheRealRandallGoforth Please Tweet Back?             
 
Although far less convoluted than the Manti Te’o saga, Randall Goforth’s 
situation was no less serious. Sometime in late October 2012, it appeared as though, 
innocently enough, Randall Goforth, University of California, Los Angeles’ (UCLA) 
then Freshmen punt returner and defensive back, set up a Twitter account under 
the handle @RandallG3000.28 The problem was that it was not Goforth at all, but an 
unknown perpetrator.29 And it did not take long for this undercover prankster to 
heat up the already deep seeded football rivalry between UCLA and University of 
Southern California (USC) sending both fan bases and players alike into a twitter 
frenzy.  
While the Twitter war raged on between the two college football 
powerhouses, the actual Randall Goforth was left completely in the dark because, 
according to Coach Jim Mora, Goforth was in a tutoring session when the “idiot” 
was out there tweeting.30 At the time of the incident, Goforth himself did not even 
have a Twitter account and he later informed the Los Angeles Times that he would 
                                                          
25 Chargers Draft LB Manti Te'o, ESPN.COM NEWS (April 27, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/draft2013/story/_/id/9215985/2013-nfl-draft-san-diego-chargers-select-manti-
teo-sixth-pick-second-round.  
26 Id. 
27 Chargers Draft, supra note 25. 
28 Paul Myerberg, Fake Twitter Account has UCLA's Jim Mora Steaming Mad, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ (Nov. 6, 
2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2012/11/06/jim-mora-ucla-fake-twitter/1687763/. 
29Id. 
30 Id. 
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not dare talk like that as a freshmen.31 Whatever Goforth would not say, however, 
@RandallG3000 had no problem tweeting. On November 5, 2012, the imposter 
infuriated the Trojan fan base, including some members of the USC football squad, 
when he boisterously tweeted, “[W]e will beat you guys on Nov. 17. Believe the 
hype.”32 After a series of exchanges between USC fans and @RandallG3000, the 
fake Goforth further enraged the USC faithful by claiming, “USC SUCKS!! WE 
WILL GET IT IN NOVEMBER 17. ALL ABOUT ACTION NO NEED TO BRAG 
JUST BE TUNED IN ON THE 17TH!!!!”33 
Quickly, the real Goforth’s UCLA teammates came to his defense alerting the 
Twitter community that this was someone impersonating Goforth and nothing 
more.34 The backlash even prompted Mora to contact then USC head coach Lane 
Kiffin to explain that this was just a hoax.35 Mora was visibly livid when he spoke to 
the media about the whole situation, noting that the “[p]ower of social media is 
amazing and when it's used in a negative way like that, it's sickening.”36 He labeled 
the imposter a “coward” and challenged whomever it was to reveal his true identity, 
but Mora noted this would never happen because “[t]hat’s what cowards do. 
Cowards hide behind print…”37    
Mora, however, continued in his criticism of the Goforth impersonator 
claiming that this individual was “the lowest form of life form if you would portray 
yourself as an 18-year-old young man who's out here trying to do his best…I think 
he ought to go to jail. That's how I feel. I think you're a scumbag."38 Although 
Mora’s comments were rife with emotion, he does unearth a serious problem 
associated with the type of social media behavior experienced by Goforth, which is 
the near impossible task of discovering who should be held accountable for Goforth’s 
harm when the actual attacker remains anonymous. Unfortunately for Goforth, due 
to the current structure of our laws, Twitter would remain free from liability despite 
the fact that it was the vehicle chosen to perpetrate the unauthorized online 
impersonation - essentially offering no remedy to Goforth.    
The circumstances surrounding Te’o and Goforth are uniquely different, but 
the natures of the indiscretions are the same. Both men were targeted because of 
their high profile statuses as NCAA college football players for major programs at 
                                                          
31 Ron Dicker, Randall Goforth Impersonator Starts Twitter War Between USC, UCLA, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/randall-goforth-
impersonator-twitter-usc-ucla-mora_n_2088357.html. 
32 Myerberg, supra note 28.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Dicker, supra note 31.  
36 Myerberg, supra note 28. 
37 Id. 
38 Myerberg, supra note 28. 
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Notre Dame and UCLA, and social media provided the platform allowing these 
athletes to be easily perpetrated. Only compounding the problem for Te’o and 
Goforth (and other similarly situated athletes) is the fact that any attempt at legal 
recourse against the ISPs in question, will likely be a futile exercise under today’s 
Internet regulations and laws to online activity. This is alarming because not only 
are ISPs protected from liability for their users’ tortious conduct, but also there is 
no deterrent for similar misconduct in the future under the current governing laws.  
II. PROTECTING THE QUARTERBACK: ISP SAFEGUARDS AND THEIR IMMUNITY FROM 
TORTIOUS INTERNET ACTIVITY   
Congress has protected ISPs by providing immunity from defamatory or tortious 
material published by their users through the CDA and the DMCA. Congress 
determined that holding ISPs liable for legal issues created by their subscribers was 
not in the public’s best interest39 and passed the CDA and the DMCA in an effort to 
protect the ISPs from liability.40 These acts render ISPs immune from tort-based 
claims stemming from a third party’s activity.41 ISP immunity from tortious conduct 
has only been expanded through the case law governing the CDA and DMCA.     
A. The Two Blocks of Granite: Legislative Safeguards  
This section will discuss both the CDA and the DMCA in depth. It will then 
explain how the higher courts, through precedent; have expanded the already broad 
ISP safeguards. The combined ramifications of the Acts, along with the case law, 
renders ISPs nearly invincible to litigation arising from the conduct of their users.    
i. The Communications Decency Act 
Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, which paved the way for the preferential 
treatment afforded to ISPs in regards to user liability.42 At the heart of the Act is 
Section 230, which offers ISPs immunity from third party liability.43 Section 
230(c)(1) of the CDA establishes a general standard in regard to all ISPs providing 
that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”44 The Act defines an “information content provider” as a “person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
                                                          
39 Cyrus Sarosh Jan Manekshaw, Liability of Isps: Immunity from Liability Under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and the Communications Decency Act, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 
101, 102 (2005). 
40 Id. at 102. 
41 Id. at 109. 
42 Id. at 106. 
43 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
44 Id. 
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service.”45 Whereas Section 230(f)(2) defines an “interactive computer service” as 
any interactive service system or provider that “enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educations institutions."46 
The distinction between an “interactive computer service” and an “information 
content provider” is a crucial one under Section 230(c)(1), as any ISP labeled an 
“interactive computer service” is free from liability for another’s content.47 Courts 
have referred to Section 230(c)(2), specifically, as the “Good Samaritan” provision of 
the CDA, despite the whole (c) subsection being entitled "Protection for 'Good 
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material."48 The “Good Samaritan” 
provision, Section 230(c)(2)(A), specifically limits civil liability for any provider or 
user of interactive computer service on account of “[a]ny action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected.”49 
Congress made sure to address the issue of preemption in Section 230(e)(3) of 
the CDA in an effort to curtail the challenge-ability of the Act. This Section declares 
that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any 
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”50 Despite the wide-ranging 
immunity bestowed upon ISPs through Section 230, it is important to note that the 
CDA is not absolute.51  
Section 230(e), which discusses the effect the Act has on other laws, highlights 
the act’s weakness.52 According to Section 230(e)(1): “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to impair the enforcement of” specific laws pertaining to obscenity or 
relating to the sexual exploitation of children or “any other Federal criminal 
statute.”53 Through its language this Section also appears to exempt intellectual 
                                                          
45 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Immunity 
Provisions of Communications  Decency Act, 52 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37 (2011). 
49 47 U.S.C. § 230 
50 47 U.S.C. § 230  
51 Manekshaw, supra note 39, at 108. 
52 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
53 Id. 
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property from the CDA since “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”54  
The courts seem to struggle with interpreting the application of the limitation 
involving intellectual property law.55 Depending on the circumstances of the case, 
courts have been split when deciding if the limitation did or did not apply to claims 
arising under state and federal law.56 Despite the intellectual property limitation to 
the Act, it is evident that Congress’ intent, which has been expounded by the case 
law, was to restrict government interference and to extend immunity from liability 
to ISPs for third party activity.57 
Another peculiarity of the CDA is located in Section 230(b), which discusses the 
policy concerns of the Act. Section 230(b)(5) proclaims that it is the United States’ 
policy to “ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.” 58 If this 
was truly a priority for Congress, then it seems almost counterproductive to grant 
such indiscriminate and extensive immunity to all ISPs who can meet the 
requirements to be labeled as an interactive computer service. However, instead of 
limiting Section 230’s safeguard protections, Congress only further broadened the 
immunity enjoyed by ISPs by virtue of the DMCA.    
ii. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The DMCA improved the shortcomings of the CDA while making the immunity 
power enjoyed by ISPs even more expansive. Congress passed the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, amid much controversy, with the purpose of 
adapting copyright law to the digital age.59 The Act consists of two crucial, and 
sometimes conflicting, goals: “promoting the continued growth and development of 
electronic commerce and protecting intellectual property rights.”60  
Section 512 of the DMCA offers ISPs a “safe harbor” or immunity from liability 
stemming from claims of copyright infringement,61 an area that was left vulnerable 
under Section 230 of the CDA.62 Section 512(b)(1) limits service providers’ liability 
for copyright infringement “by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of 
                                                          
54 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
55 Catalano, supra note 48. 
56 Id. 
57 Manekshaw, supra note 39, at 114. 
58 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
59 Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 179 A.L.R. Fed. 319 (2002). 
60 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998). 
61 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
62 Jillian Bluestone, La Russa's Loophole: Trademark Infringement Lawsuits and Social Networks, 
17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 581 (2010). 
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material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider.”63 The infringing material must: 1) be made available online by someone 
other than the service provider; 2) be transmitted by that person to a third person 
via the service provider’s network; and 3) be stored and transmitted through “an 
automatic technical process for the purpose of making the material available to 
users of the system or network” who can request to access the material from the 
person who made it available online.64 
The DMCA does not provide blanket immunity to all ISPs for infringing material 
posted on their networks, but rather qualifies only certain providers when specific 
conditions are met.65 In order for a provider to qualify for a Section 512 safe harbor, 
the provider must: 
(a)[Adopt] and reasonably [implement], and [inform] subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy 
that provides for termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or 
network who are repeat infringers; and (b)[accommodate] and does not 
interfere with standard technical measures.66 
     Even though the DMCA allows for the service providers to follow these 
guidelines reasonably, as opposed to strictly, there are limitations for the safe 
harbor provision of the Act.67 An ISP can lose its safe harbor protection when it has 
actual knowledge or should have had constructive knowledge of the infringement.68 
The safe harbor can also be limited when a service provider, upon obtaining an 
infringing activity, does not “[act] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material.”69 Therefore, in order for an ISP to enjoy the safe harbor provided by the 
DMCA, the service provider must advertise a policy against copyright infringements 
and make a realistic threat of shutting down account access to those who go against 
the policy.70 
B. The Expansion of the CDA and the DMCA Through the Courts 
Through their interpretations of the CDA and the DMCA, the federal courts 
have broadened the Act’s already far-reaching authority to the point where it 
appears as though there is no remedy available for a victim of social media 
                                                          
63 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
64 Id. 
65 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
70 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582. 
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misconduct. It is evident that at the time, the federal courts chose to protect ISPs 
from user misconduct as opposed to holding them accountable for such actions on 
their Internet platforms. The cases that followed resulted in the pivotal precedent 
that has shaped the landscape of ISP immunity as it is today.    
The landmark case of Zeran v. America Online tested the immunity power of 
Section 230 of the CDA.71 In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit held that the CDA barred 
the plaintiff’s liability claims against AOL alleging that the company “unreasonably 
delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party, 
refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar 
postings thereafter.”72 The court emphasized that Congress’ intent for Section 230 
was to restrict governmental interference and allow the Internet to police itself. 73  
The Fourth Circuit continued to interpret Congressional intent in Zeran by 
finding that the purpose behind statutory immunity was “not difficult to discern,” 
and that Congress made a “policy choice” not to “deter harmful online speech 
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages.”74 This case was 
decided in 1997 and the court then acknowledged that an ISP such as AOL was 
dealing with users in the millions and the amount of information communicated via 
interactive computer services was staggering.75 According to the Fourth Circuit, 
Congress believed that if ISPs were faced with liability claims for each message 
republished by their services, the service providers would be forced to restrict the 
number of users and messages posted, which would have a “chilling effect” on the 
freedom of internet speech.76 As a result, Congress chose to immunize ISPs to avoid 
such a restrictive result.77 
In the 1998 case of Blumenthal v. Drudge, the D.C. Circuit expanded on the 
immunities provided to ISPs via the CDA and the Zeran decision.78 The 
Blumenthals, a husband and wife, were White House Employees who brought a 
defamation action against defendant, Matt Drudge, an online columnist, and AOL 
for disseminating the defamatory content.79 AOL had entered into a one year 
licensing agreement with Drudge making the Drudge Report available to all AOL 
members in exchange for a $3,000 monthly “royalty payment” to Drudge.80 Under 
                                                          
71 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582. 
72 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
73 Id.. at 327, 330. 
74 Id. at 330-31. 
75 Id. at 331. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582. 
79 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.D.C. 1998). 
80 Id. at 47. 
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the agreement, Drudge was able to “create, edit, update and ‘otherwise manage’ the 
content of the Drudge Report” while AOL maintained the right to remove content 
that it “reasonably determined” was in violation of AOL's then standard terms of 
service.81   
In formulating its decision, the D.C. Circuit used the principals outlined in 
Zeran to begrudgingly conclude that AOL was immune from suit in this case despite 
the fact that Drudge was an AOL employee and was operating in his employment 
capacity.82 This ruling was a display of great deference to the Zeran decision since 
the D.C. Circuit ruled in this manner even though the court believed that AOL had 
taken “advantage of all the benefits conferred by Congress in the Communications 
Decency Act, and then some, without accepting any of the burdens that Congress 
intended.”83 Blumenthal would be only one of several cases to site Zeran as 
authority, which reaffirmed the findings of the Zeran court. 84 
In 2001, the Southern District of New York decided Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & 
Assoc., in which Gucci brought a trademark infringement claim against a website 
operator and the ISP which was hosting the operator’s website.85 Here, the court 
affirmed that the CDA does not provide immunity for trademark infringement 
claims against ISPs.86 The impact of this decision gave rise to several claims that 
triggered DMCA safe harbor protection.87  
The first notable case in this category was Hendrickson v. eBay, which was 
decided in 2001.88 The plaintiff was the owner of a copyright in a motion picture and 
brought this infringement action against eBay, the online auction service, which 
had listed offers to sell the alleged infringing copies of the film.89 The court applied 
a narrow interpretation of the DMCA in determining whether an ISP qualified for 
safe harbor protection and found that a service provider cannot lose its immunity 
when it engages in conduct specifically required by the DMCA.90  
The conduct specifically required by the DMCA at issue in Hendrickson is the 
requirement for an ISP to remove or block access to materials posted on its system 
once it has been notified of a claimed infringement.91 Upon receiving notice of the 
                                                          
81 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47. 
82 Id. at 51-52. 
83 Id. at 52-53. 
84 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582-83. 
85 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
86 Id. at 417. 
87 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 583. 
88 Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
89 Id. at 1084-85. 
90 Id. at 1093.  
91 Id. 
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infringement claim by the plaintiff, eBay removed the infringing listings of the 
movie pursuant to the DMCA.92 Thus, it was meritless to argue that by removing 
the infringed material that eBay had established the right and ability to control the 
infringing activity on its website.93 Furthermore, the court found that a notice of 
infringement to a service provider such as eBay must “comply substantially” with 
the elements of notification of the DMCA in order to remove safe harbor protection, 
which was not achieved in Hendrickson.94   
In Costar Group v. Loopnet, the court further expanded the DMCA 
interpretations of safe harbor immunity for service providers claiming that the 
DMCA created a floor, but not a ceiling, for ISP protection.95 The District Court of 
Maryland held that an ISP’s “policy must warn users who repeatedly infringe 
copyrights that there is a ‘realistic threat’ of losing account access.”96 Then in 2008, 
the Fifth Circuit continued the trend of extending CDA and DMCA immunities to 
include social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter in Doe v. MySpace.97 
Based on the immunity from liability provided to ISPs through the CDA and the 
DMCA and the broadening effect of these Acts via court interpretation, it seems 
unlikely that any service provider could be found liable for a tort committed by one 
of their users’ acts.98 However, many times the damaging online behavior 
necessitates some type of remedy. In these situations, it is common for these victims 
to turn to harassment statutes to find justice for their Internet grievances.     
III. INCOMPLETE PASS: HARASSMENT LAWS ILLUSTRATE HOW TRADITIONAL LAWS DO 
NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS ISP MISCONDUCT   
Harassment laws have progressed through the years in effort to adapt to our 
ever-evolving society, except when it comes to cyber harassment. Harassment, in its 
traditional offline form, is defined as “words, conduct, or action ... that ... annoys, 
alarms, or causes substantial emotional stress in [the] person and serves no 
legitimate purpose.”99 The Internet has muddled the traditional notions of 
harassment by providing increased opportunities for harassers who can 
anonymously perpetrate their victims with ease through email, blogs, or social 
media sites while at home or at work.100 As a result, there is no universal definition 
                                                          
92 Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
93 Id. 
94 Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
95 Costar Group v. Loopnet, 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004). 
96 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 584. 
97 Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
98 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328; Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at1082; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47; 
Gucci Am., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
99 Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and Privacy, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS, 231, 235 (2008). 
100 Jameson, supra note 99, at 235. 
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for cyber harassment, but it typically occurs “when an individual or group with no 
legitimate purpose uses a form of electronic communication as a means to cause 
great emotional distress to a person.”101 A cyberharasser’s motive is to frighten or 
embarrass the victim.102 
Unfortunately, Congress has not made protecting victims of cyberharassment a 
priority.103 As a result, there is currently no federal statute that directly addresses 
the various forms of cyberharassment, which means victims must rely on the 
traditional federal harassment laws and possibly state laws.104 Harassment is 
usually classified as a misdemeanor in most states, but these statutes have no 
applicable law or punishment for violators on the Internet.105  
Initially, Section 223 of the CDA made it a federal crime to use a 
telecommunications device to make harassing or obscene calls, but the Internet was 
intentionally excluded from the statute for years.106 Then, in 2006, Section 
223(a)(1)(C) was amended to incorporate into its definition of “telecommunications 
device,” “any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunications or 
other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the 
Internet.”107 After the 2006 amendment, Section 223(a)(1)(C) made it a federal 
crime for anyone using the Internet "without disclosing his identity and with intent 
to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person…who receives the 
communications.”108 Thus, Internet harassment was finally criminalized pursuant 
to the 2006 amendment.   
Based on their most recent amendments, the traditional federal statutes 
addressing harassment are trying to incorporate the online nature of the crime as 
                                                          
101 Jameson, supra note 99, at 237 (“Until Congress adopts a federal statute, the need for clearly 
stated definitions remains.”).  
102 Jameson, supra note 99, at 236. 
103 Jameson, supra note 99, at 245-46 (“Traditional, federal harassment statutes focus on physical 
contact between the harasser and the victim and therefore inappropriately address the virtual 
nature of cyberharassment. Although Congress has enacted legislation to protect children on the 
Internet, mainly from harmful content, enacting legislation to protect victims from harassers on the 
Internet has not been a congressional priority. Victims of cyberharassment are limited to civil 
litigation as a remedy: victims can sue for defamation, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Victims might also find recourse by reporting a cyberharasser to an ISP and then 
attempting to sue the ISP itself under section 509 of the CDA. However, when utilized in suits for 
unlawful conduct over the Internet, these options are increasingly restricted and leave victims of 
cyberharassment ineffectively protected. Fortunately, Congress has started to recognize the 
increasing problems caused by cyberharassment.”).  
104 2 RONALD N. WEIKERS ET AL., , Dᴀᴛᴀ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ Lᴀᴡ § 15:18 (2d ed. 2014). 
105 Jameson, supra note 99, at 246. 
106 WEIKERS, supra note 104. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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evidenced by Section 223(a)(1)(C). However, issues with applying them to 
cyberharassment still remain. The fundamental problem in applying such laws to 
cyberharassment is due to the traditional statute’s strong focus on the physical and 
direct contact between the harasser and the victim, which makes the statute 
ineffective when dealing with the cyber aspect of harassment.109 For instance, 
applying Section 223(a)(1)(C) to a catfishing hoax or to a false Twitter account 
prank would be difficult because the specific nature of those activities do not fit into 
the statutory definition of harassment. It is important to note that the statute itself 
inherently carries with it issues of vagueness, as well as First Amendment free 
speech challenges.110  
Since there is no federal statute regulating cyberharassment and there is no 
current federal harassment law that adequately addresses the cyber aspect of 
harassment, victims of the crime are forced to find a remedy through civil litigation. 
111 The Megan Meier’s “MySpace Suicide Hoax” illustrates the consequences of not 
having a specific statute penalizing cyberharassment.112 Megan was a thirteen-
year-old girl who hanged herself due to a MySpace prank that was played on her by 
her forty-seven year old neighbor, Lori Drew.113 Drew created a MySpace account 
under the fictitious name Josh Evans with the intent to discover whether or not 
Megan spread rumors about Drew’s daughter.114  
During a two-hour time frame on the night she committed suicide, Megan 
became a target of intense cyberharassment, analogous to a “teenage mob on the 
Web.”115 The “mob” tormented Megan by calling her fat and a slut, as well as 
spreading other rumors about her, and said that no one should befriend her.116 
Tragically, Megan ended her life that night, and without a federal statute 
specifically criminalizing the cyberharassment she suffered. Thus, holding Drew 
criminally responsible for her role in the suicide will likely be unsuccessful, leaving 
civil litigation as Megan’s family’s sole remedy.117 
Victims of cyberharassment can attempt to sue for defamation, invasion of 
privacy, and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress, along with other torts.118 
The voluntary nature of the Internet combined with the high burden the plaintiff 
carries in presenting clear evidence proving the defendant’s state of mind to 
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intentionally cause harm, makes it very difficult for a plaintiff to win on these 
claims.119 
Another major problem associated with cyberharassment is the anonymous 
nature of the Internet, because too often the victim does not know the harasser’s 
identity or is mistaken as to the true identity of the harasser.120 These victims may 
try to find recourse through suing the ISP after reporting the cyberharassment to 
the ISP under the CDA.121 ISP immunity, however, as previously discussed, is 
incredibly broad and the standard of proof required to find one liable for a user’s 
message is very high. This limits the options for cyberharassment victims and 
leaves them ineffectively protected by the law.122 Failure to allow relief from ISPs 
renders these plaintiffs without a remedy. 
IV. THE 4TH QUARTER 
 
The CDA, the DMCA, and the corresponding case law, appear to leave Te’o and 
Gorforth without a remedy against the social media conglomerates, Facebook and 
Twitter. It seems evident that Congress chose to legislate away any claim to 
damages that would have been available to the two athletes. The harms that Te’o 
and Goforth suffered are so pervasive and rapidly becoming commonplace in our 
cyber-world that Congress must do something to address this inequity. This is the 
type of conduct the CDA promised to protect against in its policy section, but 
instead, Congress has only allowed this kind of cyber misconduct to flourish without 
recourse.   
Te’o and Goforth will have an incredibly difficult time establishing a successful 
tort claim against Facebook and Twitter, respectively. Section 230 of the CDA 
specifically states that ISPs will not be treated as the “publisher or speaker” for the 
content of a third party.123 The act also prohibits civil liability in instances where 
the service provider acted in good faith to remove or restrict access to materials 
considered by the provider to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”124 The immunity afforded to 
Facebook and Twitter by Section 230 of the CDA would appear to thwart a tort 
claim brought forth by Te’o or Goforth on its face.   
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Then, the Zeran decision expanded Section 230 ISP immunity so far as to make 
recovery virtually impossible for Te’o and Goforth.125 The court held that instead of 
having ISPs actively limit and restrict online speech in fear of being liable for its 
content, “Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and 
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”126 In other 
words, an ISP is not required to screen each of its millions of postings for possible 
problems and is free from liability from such postings pursuant to the CDA.127 Even 
if Te’o or Goforth could establish that there was “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material that caused 
them injury on either site, Facebook and Twitter are not obligated to screen for that 
content and, therefore, cannot be held liable for its appearance on their networks. .  
The DMCA, by way of Section 512, strengthens the weakness of Section 230 of 
the CDA by offering ISPs “safe harbor” protection from monetary damages for 
claims of copyright infringement.128 Finally, the court in Doe v. MySpace, extended 
CDA and DCMA immunities to include social media sites, thus rendering Facebook 
and Twitter seemingly impervious to tort liability for their users’ conduct.129  
Although it is likely that Te’o and Goforth would be precluded from successfully 
suing the appropriate social media sites for tort liability, they could attempt to 
bring a possible cyberharassment claim due to the nature and extent of their 
victimization. While filing a cyberharassment claim is an option, it is likely that 
both players would fail on that ground as well.  
Te’o appears to have a stronger cyberharassment claim than does Goforth, 
because Te’o can readily identify his alleged “harasser” as Ronaiah Tuiasosopo who 
has accepted responsibility for the catfishing hoax.130 Pursuant to Section 
223(a)(1)(C) of the federal cybercrime statute, it is a federal crime for anyone to use 
the Internet "without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, 
threaten, or harass any person…who receives the communications.”131 Applying this 
statute to Tuiasosopo’s online activity, however, will be difficult to accomplish for a 
few reasons. First, Tuiasosopo clearly did not reveal his true identity to Te’o, but he 
did go to great lengths to assume a fictitious identity instead of remaining 
anonymous. This is an important difference, because it lends insight into 
                                                          
125 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 580. 
126 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
127 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582. 
128 Id. at 580. 
129 Id. 
130 Eder, Te’o Answers, supra note 20 (since Ronaiah Tuiasosopo came forward and accepted 
responsibility for the hoax). 
131 WEIKERS, supra note 104. 
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Tuiasosopo’s mindset during the catfishing hoax, which is pivotal when trying to 
interrupt his intent.    
Second, it is unclear and nearly impossible to prove that Tuiasosopo’s intent was 
to “annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass” Te’o given the bizarre nature of this case.132 
People have speculated a variety of possible motives for Tuiasosopo, ranging from 
him seeking the thrill of a successful publicized catfishing hoax, to a potential 
financial payout from Te’o down the line.133 By all accounts, however, it is still 
unclear as to what motivated Tuiasosopo’s behavior, assuming he was definitely the 
architect behind the hoax.134 Tuiasosopo, in his interview with Dr. Phil, claimed 
that pretending to be Lennay Kekua gave him an “escape” from his life and that he 
developed “feelings” and “emotions” for Te’o that eventually Tuiasosopo “couldn’t 
control anymore.”135  
Based on Tuiasosopo’s account, which is difficult to rely on since he is an 
admitted liar and hoaxer,136 his actions do not appear to meet the intent 
requirement of Section 223(a)(1)(C) and proving otherwise will be challenging. Te’o’s 
voluntary participation in the matter will not aid in establishing the intent 
requirement of Section 223(a)(1)(C) either. Tuiasosopo clearly duped Te’o into 
believing Kekua was an actual person, but the fact remains, Te’o was a willing 
party in the relationship, which leads to the question, “how harassing was 
Tuiasosopo’s behavior?”  
Despite Te’o’s participation in the catfishing hoax, he was still injured by the 
actions of Tuiasosopo. It seems likely, however, that Tuiasosopo’s actions will fall 
outside the scope of Section 223(a)(1)(C) because the intent requirement cannot be 
established. Thus, the current harassment laws do not seem equipped to 
incriminate complex catfishing hoaxes. 
The circumstances surrounding Goforth’s online impersonation seemingly 
disqualify any potential cyberharassment claim he may have under Section 
223(a)(1)(C). Even if Goforth could establish the intent burden of Section 
223(a)(1)(C), he was not the person who “receive[d] the communications,” and was 
therefore not the subject of any harassment himself, as the statute requires.137   
                                                          
132 Eder, Te’o Answers, supra note 20.  
133 Id.   
134 Eder, Te’o Answers, supra note 20.  
135 Timothy Burke & Jack Dickey, Here's Everything Ronaiah Tuiasosopo Told Dr. Phil in Day One 
Of His Exclusive Interview, DEADSPIN (Jan. 31, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://deadspin.com/5980594/heres-
everything-ronaiah-tuiasosopo-told-dr-phil-in-day-one-of-his-exclusive-interview. 
136 Eder, Te’o Answers, supra note 20. 
137 WEIKERS,  supra note 104. 
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Furthermore, an anonymous individual committed the online impersonation.  As 
a result, Goforth’s cyberharassment claim would have to be brought against 
Twitter, which is clearly immune from third party actions, under the immunities 
provided to ISPs through the CDA and the DMCA. The extensive safeguarding 
power afforded to the ISPs, coupled with the nonexistent federal statute that 
directly addresses the specific nature of all the various new forms of 
cyberharassment, leaves no available recourse for either Te’o or Goforth. 
V. THE “HAIL MARY”   
 
The evolving nature of the Internet creates new challenges in its regulation almost 
on a daily basis.  As a result of these challenges, the Legislature needs to create new 
laws or amend the current ones so that ISPs can no longer hide behind blanket 
immunity for all of their users’ behavior. However, given the legislative safeguard 
protections enjoyed by the CDA and the DMCA, coupled with the courts’ apparent 
stance that this type of Internet misconduct is not something that needs to be 
protected, it is likely that nothing will change unless the CDA and the DMCA are 
amended. Amending the CDA and the DMCA, however, is almost as unlikely as 
completing a successful “Hail Mary” as time expires to win the Super Bowl; 
meaning Te’o and Goforth will be left on the sidelines without a remedy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The lights of one thousand skyscrapers pierce the pitch-black night sky.  A 
city rises from the sea, crowding an island that is 13.4 miles long and at most 2.3 
miles wide.  The city stretches out, familiar to most in the entire western world.  
Locals gaze upon the unmistakable shape of One World Trade Center and feel a 
sense of completeness, a monument to American spirit and the inability of foes 
abroad to crush that spirit.  It is, to many, the center of the universe, the place 
where dreams come true, the city that never sleeps.  But as soon as the viewer 
knows this is New York City, they are proven wrong.  This is not the New York City 
known by all and beloved by some.  This is a dark reflection of The City as a human 
cultural touchstone.  This City is consumed by some shadow that can never be seen 
head on.  Lives are shorter here, more brutal.  Criminals rule the streets while the 
police are unwilling or unable to serve and protect.  This is a city protected not by 
the watchful members of the New York Police Department, but by the Dark Knight.  
This is Gotham. 
 There is a scene in Chris Nolan’s film, The Dark Knight Rises, where an 
aerial shot of Gotham shows the island city before the film’s antagonist destroys the 
bridges leading into the city.  The aerial shot clearly shows Manhattan; the bridges 
that are destroyed include the George Washington bridge, among other well-known 
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thoroughfares.  The symbolism can be jarring for some, particularly given New 
York’s relationship with the concept of terrorism.  It is a film (and a series) uniquely 
suited to post-9/11 America, and yet it bears the mantle of the modern myth, the 
Superhero.   
 While these heroes protect the innocent, who protects them?  Perhaps more 
importantly (for the owners and studios), who protects the vast profit they are 
capable of generating?  In just a decade and a half since the modern superhero film 
exploded onto the scene,1 the comic books and graphic novels that have long been 
the very definition of a fringe or niche interest, have morphed into a multi-billion 
dollar film, television and video game empire.  The two main players in this 
industry, Marvel2 and DC,3 are owned by juggernauts in the entertainment 
industry.  More importantly, some of these characters have been around for over 
three-quarters of a century.4  Readers keyed into intellectual property law, 
particularly copyright, should begin to see the issue.  The copyright protection on 
these characters will expire in the coming years, and could potentially open up a 
wide range of other works based on these venerable and valuable properties.  While 
trademark law may provide some limited protections, there may in fact be another 
way for these characters to be protected.   
 There are several exceptions to copyright, but the one most applicable to our 
case is the prohibition against recognizing copyright protection for “Scènes à Faire.”  
Succinctly put, the doctrine prohibits copyrighting a scene that is indispensable to 
conveying basic information about the overall copyrighted work.  In other words, 
using a skyline shot of New York City to convey that a film is set in New York City 
is not copyrightable on its own, even though the rest of the film is certainly eligible 
for protection.  In a similar manner, facts may not be copyrighted.  However, 
fictional facts may be.  For example, the fact that Superman was born on the planet 
Krypton and sent to Earth as a baby to be raised in Smallville by the Kent family 
are ‘facts’ of a sort, but as fictional facts they are subject to copyright protection. 
 The world of comic books is full of hypothetical questions regarding 
competing forces.  Can Thor’s hammer (the irresistible force) destroy Captain 
America’s shield (the immovable object)?5  Who is faster, Superman or The Flash?6  
                                                          
1 X-MEN (20th Century Fox 2000). 
2 Marvel is owned by Disney. Ben Fritz, Disney Tells Details of Marvel Entertainment Acquisition in 
a Regulatory Filing, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/23/business/fi-
ct-marvel23. 
3 DC is owned by Warner Brothers. DC Entertainment, WARNER BROTHERS, 
http://www.warnerbros.com/studio/divisions/dc-entertainment (last accessed May 19, 2015). 
4 ACTION COMICS 1 (Detective Comics June 1938) (the first appearance of Superman). 
5 MARVEL’S THE AVENGERS (Marvel Studios 2012) (no, it cannot). 
6 In this author’s mind, the Flash is faster. However, other comic book enthusiasts may think 
otherwise. 
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In this mix we bring a legal conundrum to join the debates that swarm around 
conventions and online message boards.  What happens when fictional facts interact 
with scènes à faire in the manner that occurs in films based on comic books?  Which 
wins, the protectable nature of fictional facts or the generic scenes that are bereft of 
protection? In this note I will argue that when fictional facts interact with scènes à 
faire in comic book movies, the previously unprotected scenes gain copyright 
protectable status.  While this may seem a moot point, it is not.  The extensive 
protections offered by copyright will enable those copyright holders to continue 
exploiting the vast commercial value of those rights for decades to come. 
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE 
A. Narrowing the Field 
 To begin with, we must focus our attention on a single company, DC Comics, 
Inc.  This is important for a number of reasons.  To begin with, DC and Marvel 
Comics are the largest producers of comic books and graphic novels in the world.  
These two companies together command a significant majority in market share,7 
and they hold the most valuable ‘books of business’ in the industry.  While the two 
companies trade places from time to time on the top of the sales charts, they are the 
undisputed kings of the industry.   
 The main purpose in focusing on DC over Marvel is twofold.  First, Marvel 
sets their comics (and the films based on them) in primarily real world 
environments.  New York is New York, Chicago is Chicago, and so on.  The unique 
and fictional settings in Marvel comics are indisputably original and have yet to be 
featured prominently in film.  Conversely, DC comics feature entirely fictional 
cities, from Gotham to Metropolis to Central City, Coast City and Star City.8  These 
cities, when they are depicted in audiovisual works, need either massive (and 
massively expensive) backlots and soundstages, or stand-ins.  Stunt cities, so to 
speak.  Chicago has played the part of both Gotham and Metropolis (as has New 
York), Los Angeles has even played double to Gotham, and Pittsburgh has newly 
been crowned Central City.9 
 The final reason we are focusing on DC properties is one of time.  DC, 
descended from Detective Comics, is a truly venerable company in the industry.  
Two of their most popular and enduring characters first debuted in the late thirties, 
                                                          
7 Mat Elfring, Top Selling Comics & Publisher Market Share: August 2014, COMIC VINE (Sept. 5, 
2014), http://www.comicvine.com/articles/top-selling-comics-publisher-market-share-august-2/1100-
149758/ (as of August, 2014, Marvel and DC together commanded 62.98% of the dollar share and 
68.41% of the unit share). 
8 MICHAEL TEITELBAUM ET. AL. THE DC COMICS ENCYCLOPEDIA, UPDATED AND EXPANDED EDITION 
(2008). 
9 The Flash (CW television broadcast, 2014-2015). 
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and while Marvel is descended from a contemporary company, the modern 
incarnation of Marvel began publishing in 1961 with The Fantastic Four.  
Additionally, many of DC’s properties are owned wholly by DC, rather than human 
authors retaining copyrights.  The ownership of copyright in Marvel characters, 
however, is not clear.10  For that reason, many Marvel copyrights may not expire for 
decades after Mr. Lee is deceased, while the clock is most definitely ticking on 
Superman and Batman.11 
B. Why It Matters 
 At first this issue may appear purely academic.  However, that is not the 
case.  While it is true that this will not be a testable issue for nearly twenty years, 
Warner Brothers has already laid out plains for production and development on 
movies based on DC properties through 2020.  The superhero genre is incredibly 
lucrative, with comic books and graphic novels alone amassing roughly $870 million 
in sales in 2013.  That figure pales even more when one views the world-wide box 
office revenue for Man of Steel, the most recent Warner Brothers film based on 
Superman: over $660 million.  That is only one film; in 2013, theatrically released 
superhero films grossed over three billion dollars12.  Superhero films have become a 
genre in and of themselves, and some movies are even referred to as “following the 
Marvel formula.”13  That amount of money can make or break companies, and when 
they acquired Marvel, Disney discovered the goose that laid a golden egg14.  While 
Warner Brothers and DC have not emulated the runaway success of Marvel, they 
have nonetheless seen impressive returns.  When that much money is at stake, the 
property must be protected. 
 Hypothetically, by 2033, after Warner Brothers has poured millions of dollars 
into development and production of an extensive franchise of superhero characters 
                                                          
10 Stan Lee Media Fights Disney for the Iron Man, Spider-Man and X-Men Copyright in Lawsuit, 
INQUISITR (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1572737/stan-lee-media-fights-disney-for-the-
iron-man-spider-man-and-x-men-copyright-in-lawsuit/. 
11 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012) (copyright expires 95 years after publication, which is 2033 for 
Superman, and 2034 for Batman). 
12 BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (showing earnings 
for Iron Man 3: $1,215,439,994, Man of Steel: $668,045,518, The Wolverine: $414,828,246, Kick-Ass 2: 
$59,556,104, Thor: The Dark World: $644,783,140, with a total box office gross revenue of 
$3,002,653,002). 
13 Keith Staskiewicz, Review of Big Hero 6, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (Jan. 17, 2015, 5:04 PM), 
http://www.ew.com/article/2014/11/14/big-hero-6 (perhaps unsurprising for a Disney film based off of 
a Marvel property). 
14 BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (even 2014’s 
Guardians of the Galaxy, based on an obscure group of misfits and anti-heroes, became a surprise hit 
with a worldwide gross revenue of over $770 million). 
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and team ups, another company could make a Superman film, capitalizing on the 
investments made by Warner Brothers and diluting the market for future films.  
While recent individual stories will still be protected by copyright, the only law 
shielding Superman from exploitation by other companies is the rather flimsy 
shield of trademark protection.15  In the event this protection of Superman should 
elapse, Warner Brothers will surely hire a veritable army of intellectual property 
attorneys, and I am deeply sorry for my fellow classmates and peers who may be 
among those attorneys, as it may not be necessary.  Warner Brothers can 
essentially block out competing companies from ever being able to make practical 
use of their characters in a blockbuster film environment in a very simple way.  
They can use the fictional facts imposed upon scènes à faire to copyright those 
scenes.  In other words, New York City as Gotham is a copyright owned by Warner 
Brothers, and that copyright will last until at least the year 2108.16 
 It is important to note that when (and if) these copyrights expire, the only 
copyrights that will expire will be in the initial appearances of the characters.  
Many portions of the character and storylines of the characters have been 
introduced over decades, and those adaptations will still be under copyright 
protection.17  However, with every year that passes, more and more of that original 
idea will pass into the public domain. 
II. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF EXPANDING PROTECTION 
 
 Before launching into a discussion and analysis of combining scènes à faire 
with fictional facts to create a copyrightable piece of expression, it behooves us to 
ensure that this is necessary even in the hypothetical and prospective framework 
being considered.  It is true that there are at least two methods of expanding or 
maintaining the protections held by owners of comic book characters and settings, 
but neither provides a perfect solution.  Whether the focus is on extending the term 
of copyright or trademark protections, both possibilities come with their own 
difficulties and drawbacks. 
A. Extended Copyright Terms 
 As long as Mickey Mouse has value, copyrights will never expire.  That was a 
quip by my Copyright Law professor, and all joking aside, it holds a grain of truth.  
                                                          
15 See infra part III(B). 
16 The aforementioned scene of New York appeared in the 2013 film, The Dark Knight Rises, the 
copyright of which will expire in 2108, 95 years later. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012). 
17 I.e., When Superman first appeared, he was a wildly different character than the “last son of 
Krypton,” now known to comic book fans.  While competitors may be wary of exploiting a character 
many people may not recognize, it is still essential to protect these original properties regardless of 
the likelihood of needing such protection. 
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Disney was certainly one of the forces behind the passage of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)18 and its defense in the courts.19  While 
Disney’s power and influence are not to be denied,20 AOL Time Warner (owner of 
DC) specifically filed an amicus brief on behalf of the respondent. The main thrust 
of the CTEA was to extend copyright protections to a term of life plus seventy years 
for authors or a flat ninety-five years for works created anonymously, under a 
pseudonym or as works for hire.21  This act also added a flat twenty years to already 
existing copyrights provided they had been properly extended under the earlier 
copyright regime.   
 When the CTEA faced a constitutional attack, a great deal of attention was 
placed on what exactly was meant or intended by the I.P. clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.22  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the court, determined that the 
question was a rather simple one.  In other words, although the act did extend the 
term of copyright, that term would still terminate and it was still a “limited time.”23  
It seems likely that as the term of certain valuable copyrights approaches their 
expiration, there will be another push towards extending the copyright term.24 
 It is worth noting, however, that this method of continuing copyright 
protection is a stopgap measure at best.  The primary hurdle to pass in order to 
extend the copyright protection term is the sentiment embodied in Justice Stevens’ 
dissent in Eldred.25  Stevens asserts that despite the definition of “limited time,” 
extensions of copyright such as the CTEA will eventually extend copyright 
protection infinitely, creating a congressional overreach that will surpass the 
original constitutional provision.26  Similarly, Justice Breyer attacked the 
congressional motivations behind extending copyright, seeing comments by 
members of Congress as proof of an intent to eventually bypass the constitutional 
mandate of limited time altogether.27 
                                                          
18 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
19 See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
20 Particularly since Disney now owns Marvel and thus has a vested interest in the continuing 
expansion of copyright protections as they relate to comic book properties. 
21 Under the previous version of the Copyright Act, these terms were universally twenty years less. 
Copyright Act of 1976, 94 Pub. L. 553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), amended by Copyright Term Extension 
Act, 112 Stat. 2827. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“[t]o promote the Progress of…useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors…the exclusive Right to their respective….” (emphasis added)). 
23 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 189. 
24 Mickey Mouse’s copyright protection is to expire in the near future, creating a copyright issue to be 
addressed. 
25 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
26 Id. at 223. 
27 Id. at 256 (Congress did not intend to act unconstitutionally. But, it may have sought to test the 
Constitution's limits. After all, the statute was named after a Member of Congress, who, as the 
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 While the dissenting opinions were clearly insufficient to sway the majority of 
the Court, these bits of dicta are nonetheless important as future copyright 
extensions are contemplated.  Should Congress (as a result of the lobbying of 
influential copyright owners) extend the term of copyright again, eventually the 
Court will step in to curtail such extensions.  It is unclear if this would happen the 
next time an extension occurs or multiple extensions in the future, but it is nearly 
inevitable that the Court will in fact begin enforcing the “limited time” 
constitutional requirement.  Because of the level of Supreme Court prognostication 
required to guess when this will occur, it would be far more secure for copyright 
owners to seek alternative means of strengthening their copyrights.   
B. Trademark Protection 
 “All characters, their distinctive likenesses and related elements featured in 
this publication are trademarks of DC Comics.”28  That should end our inquiry right 
then and there.  If these characters have trademark protection, then the creators 
and owners of the characters can just rely on that, can’t they?  Unfortunately, this 
is not the case.  While trademark protections do have at least one benefit over 
copyright,29 there are numerous other issues that make trademark law ill-suited to 
the task at hand.  Chief among those issues are that some superhero characters 
may actually not be eligible for trademark. Trademark protections are generally 
less robust than those afforded to copyright, and the Supreme Court has ruled that 
subject matter that should fall under copyright law should not receive the benefits 
of trademark protection because the laws serve entirely different purposes. 
 Certain superheroes may lack the hallmark of distinctiveness necessary to 
fend off serious challenges to trademark validity.  Since Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World,30 four broad categories of textual marks31 have been recognized in 
trademark law.32  While fanciful or arbitrary marks are afforded a wide 
presumption of validity, generic and descriptive marks are not.  Descriptive marks 
must demonstrate secondary meaning in order to be valid, and generic marks are 
presumptively invalid and cannot achieve secondary meaning.  The majority of 
superhero names are arguably quite clearly descriptive marks.  A man who dresses 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
legislative history records show, “wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.” (citation 
omitted)). 
28 GEOFF JOHNS ET AL., JUSTICE LEAGUE VOLUME 1: ORIGIN 4 (Eddie Berganza et al. eds., 2012). 
29 15 U.S.C.A. § 1059 (2012) (trademarks may be perpetually renewed if statutory requirements are 
met). 
30 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
31 Id. (textual marks are words or phrases that an individual or a company seeks to register as a 
trademark). 
32 Id. (the four categories include: fanciful marks (often a word with no independent meaning), 
arbitrary marks (a word with no inherent connection to the product it will mark), descriptive marks 
(a word describing a product or a service) and generic marks (a generic word or phrase). 
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up as a bat is Batman.  A man with power of water is Aquaman.  A woman with 
incredible super powers is Wonder Woman.   
 Luckily for the owners of the marks, it is clear that substantial secondary 
meaning has been achieved.  In other words, in the United States, people hear the 
name Batman and assume that the comic book character is being referenced.  
Meanwhile, some superheroes begin to toe the line between descriptive and generic 
marks.  Green Lantern, for example, quite literally gains his superpowers from a 
ring powered by a green lantern.  Then you have characters whose names are 
distressingly close to generic marks.  A man who can seemingly do anything and 
exists as an ideal for the world to aspire to is Superman.33  A villainous take on a 
clown who exists as a foil for a dour hero is Joker.  If these marks are deemed 
generic, no amount of secondary meaning can save them.  They will be 
invalidated.34   
 The ease with which an invalid trademark can be stripped of protection is 
just a single example of the limitations of trademark protection compared to that of 
copyright.  Copyright offers a full suite of rights and protections, including the 
ability create additional works drawing upon the same creative work.  Trademarks, 
conversely, exist exclusively in the realm of commerce.  Having a trademark in 
Superman allows Warner Brothers to use the popular “S” shield emblazoned on 
goods and to prevent other business from doing the same.  At best, a trademark 
infringement suit against another writer or film producer could require the 
infringer to drop the name or symbol.35 
 The final problem with relying on trademark protection is that the Supreme 
Court has decided that trademark protection should not overlap with copyright 
protection.36 
[T]he Lanham Act prohibits actions like trademark infringement that 
deceive consumers and impair a producer's goodwill…The words of the 
Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically 
                                                          
33 There is an interesting argument to be made that Superman is a derivative of Nietzche’s 
Ubermensch.  See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA (1896). 
34 Gotham, originally coined as a term for New York City by Washington Irving in the nineteenth 
century, is another example of a generic mark. 
35 In the 2014 film, Man of Steel, the “S” shield was completely redesigned and the word “Superman” 
was used only once.  A competing film could arguably do the same and avoid trademark liability.  
Without delving too deeply into comic book minutiae, another important departure from the original 
material occurred.  Superman’s emblem is generally portrayed as the symbol of his “house” or family.  
In Man of Steel it is described as an alien symbol for hope.  This disassociation from previous 
copyrighted expression could be done in other films as well, preventing a suit alleging copying of the 
character as it was developed after the initial copyright. 
36 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
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of no consequence to purchasers. It could be argued, perhaps, that the 
reality of purchaser concern is different for what might be called a 
communicative product—one that is valued not primarily for its 
physical qualities, such as a hammer, but for the intellectual content 
that it conveys, such as a book or, as here, a video. The purchaser of a 
novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer 
of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in 
the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the author). And the 
author, of course, has at least as much interest in avoiding passing off 
(or reverse passing off) of his creation as does the publisher. For such a 
communicative product (the argument goes) “origin of goods” in § 43(a) 
must be deemed to include not merely the producer of the physical 
item…The problem with this argument according special treatment to 
communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict 
with the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically. The 
right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has 
expired, like “the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when 
patented—passes to the public.37 
 
Justice Scalia, in clear and unambiguous terms, rejected the argument that 
trademark would be used to create a sort of perpetual protection for intellectual 
property, something clearly prohibited by the United States Constitution.38   
 In this case, the subject matter in question was nothing less than a full 
audiovisual program.  It is possible to say that, on more narrow scales, the Supreme 
Court may allow trademark to succeed as an avenue of protection, but several very 
important distinctions need to be made.  The sheer scale of the financial power 
behind the superhero genre means that ruling in favor of trademark is, in fact, far 
more broad than this holding, and will likely be discarded by the court. 
III. SCÈNES À FAIRE AND FICTIONAL FACTS AS A METHOD OF EXTENDING 
COPYRIGHT 
 
 Having examined alternative avenues to extending or further strengthening 
the protection currently afforded the owners of the intellectual property in question, 
our investigation turns to a more novel approach and the crux of this analysis: 
utilizing the legal principle that fictional facts can be copyrighted (as opposed to the 
                                                          
37 Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 32-33 (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at 37; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (guaranteeing exclusive rights for limited times). 
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normal rule that facts are unprotectable) to make scènes à faire copyrightable.  To 
begin, a brief overview of the scènes à faire doctrine (in addition to an overview of 
fictional facts) is necessary, followed by case law that has come close to integrating 
the concepts. 
 While this area of legal theory is currently untested, there are legal 
principles and case law that can be used to formulate future predictions about the 
success of this integration.  An examination of that law will follow, and this note 
will attempt to lay out a roadmap that will predict on what side the courts will fall 
should this integration be utilized in an attempt to extend the existing protections 
afforded by copyright law. 
 Finally, even if this integration of scènes à faire and fictional facts is 
successful, there are pitfalls and workarounds that the owners of the intellectual 
property must be aware of.  The only truly ironclad protection for these valuable 
properties is an extension of the copyright term.  Relying on this integration is 
theoretically possible, but should not be considered a first line of defense.  Some of 
the more glaring pitfalls will be addressed at the end of this section. 
A. A Brief Introduction to Scènes à Faire and Fictional Facts 
 On the surface, the legal principle of scènes à faire is a simple one.39  Certain 
scenes or situations are inherently necessary to a form of expression, and thus 
cannot be copyrighted independently of the work as whole.  An example would be 
the use of skyline shots to show that an audiovisual work is set in a given city.40  
Other examples of scènes à faire include the “indispensable elements” of a genre or 
category of creative expression.41  A still image from The Dark Knight Rises, alluded 
to in the introduction, clearly shows the skyline of lower Manhattan.42  Bereft of any 
other significance, this shot falls squarely within the scènes à faire doctrine when 
used to denote that some activity is occurring in a large city (such as New York 
City).  The creative aspects of the scene are copyrightable, but the use of such a 
wide shot to inform the viewers of the location of the action is not.  
 Scènes à faire have their roots in the traditional copyright principle known as 
the idea/expression dichotomy.  Put succinctly, bare ideas cannot be the subject of 
copyright, but the expression of those ideas can be.43  These indispensable scenes 
                                                          
39 See generally Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79 (1989) 
(for a more in-depth overview of the scènes à faire doctrine). 
40 See, e.g., Castle (ABC television broadcast 2009-2015) (an example of a modern television show 
that uses skyline shots of a given city while being filmed in a city with significantly lower operating 
costs. Castle was filmed in Vancouver while portraying New York City.). 
41 Kurtz, supra note 39 at 92-94. 
42 See infra Appendix. 
43 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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have become ideas in their own right by virtue of their indispensable nature.  The 
common building blocks of a police procedural or a hospital drama, for example, 
cannot be copyrighted beyond the particular expression of those building blocks 
utilized in a given creative work.  This principle has found its expression in case law 
as well.  When attempting to assert his copyright over certain historical aspects of a 
book he had published, A.A. Hoehling was stymied by the Second Circuit’s 
determination that such historical information was not copyrightable, as well as the 
fact that scenes of Germans singing in a beer hall and theories of sabotage were 
indispensable from a film about the tragic final flight of the Hindenburgh.44 
 As Hoehling and other case law demonstrates, the scènes à faire doctrine is 
tied very closely with the bedrock concept that facts cannot be copyrighted.45  A fact 
such as “the earth orbits the sun, which is a star located in the Milky Way galaxy” 
cannot be the subject of copyright, because these facts are fully and squarely within 
the public domain.46  In a manner of speaking, scènes à faire and facts are both 
concepts and ideas that must be expressed in a creative way to create a 
copyrightable work, and they remain on their own unprotected.  The author of a 
book detailing a new method of accounting, for example, can certainly own the 
copyright in his expression of this new method.  However, the forms and paperwork 
used to carry out this method of accounting contains nothing but facts and is 
indispensable to the art expressed in the book.47 
 These clear-cut legal principles tend to gain a murky quality when the 
subject of fictional facts arise.  Ask any avid trivia-night bar goer and “Han Solo’s 
ship is called the Millenium Falcon” is most assuredly a true fact.  The entire 
nature of the subject matter is fictional, however, which changes the legal 
landscape, particularly as it relates to copyright.  Copyright in Star Wars lies 
squarely with its creator and assigns.48  Therefore, this “fact” is part and parcel of 
that copyright and defeats the standard legal principle. 
 Fictional facts are clearly copyrightable, and an unauthorized use of those 
facts can be the basis of an infringement lawsuit.49  When a fan of J.K. Rowling’s 
Harry Potter series of books wished to publish an encyclopedia of information from 
that series, the facts therein were held to be the creative property of the author and 
whosoever held the copyright.  “Although hundreds of pages or thousands of 
fictional facts may amount to only a fraction of the seven-book series, this quantum 
                                                          
44 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
45 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
46 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
47 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
48 Parsing out whether Disney or George Lucas owns these copyrights is not the subject of this note, 
and would require investigating the contracts signed by the parties. 
49 Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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of copying is sufficient to support a finding of substantial similarity where the 
copied expression is entirely the product of the original author's imagination and 
creation.”50 
 RDR Books relies on a two-part analysis developed from cases such as 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc.,51 essentially looking at two levels of 
copying in order to determine copyright infringement.  The first level is quantitative 
copying, which refers to how much of the material was copied.  In Ringgold, for 
example, the copyrighted expression in question was a “story quilt,” and the quilt 
was copied in its entirety.52  Similarly, the court determined in RDR Books that a 
significant portion of the Harry Potter Lexicon involved direct quotations and 
significant paraphrases of Rowling’s novels.53  The second level of analysis is 
qualitative copying.  Qualitative copying is reminiscent of other “overall look and 
feel” tests in copyright law, and the inquiry is focused on the alleged infringer’s 
adoption of the copyright holders general creative effort.  As an example, the author 
of the Harry Potter Lexicon relied exclusively on the creative work and fictional 
facts created by Rowling.54 
 In one easily imagined situation, a film starring the character of Batman 
could be found to lack the necessary quantitative copying to find infringement.  
However, any such film would have to rely on fictional facts and thus could be found 
to have qualitatively copied the creative efforts that came after the initial character 
creation. 
 This example clearly demonstrates that ‘facts’ such as: “Batman lives and 
fights crime in Gotham City” is a copyrightable portion of the creative work owned 
by Warner Brothers.  Just as clearly, Christopher Nolan’s skyline shot of 
Manhattan is an unprotectable scène à faire.  What then, about the integration of 
these two ideas?  Does Manhattan AS Gotham rise to the level of copyrightable 
expression? 
B. Integration of the Two Concepts: Past Court Decisions and Future Predictions 
 Perhaps due to the prospective nature of this issue, there is little guidance 
given through case law that is on all fours with the idea of integrating fictional facts 
with scènes à faire.  Instead, a roadmap of what direction courts will likely take 
must be constructed from the cases that do exist.  These cases include an instance of 
independently protected sculptural works losing that protection in the context of 
                                                          
50 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d  at 535. 
51 Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
52 Id. at 72. 
53 RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
54 Id. at 536. 
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fictional facts and independent creative portrayals,55 cases that narrow the 
copyright protection extended to poorly developed characters,56 and cases that detail 
what must be added to scènes à faire to make them no longer incapable of obtaining 
copyright protection.57 
 In Leicester v. Warner Bros.,58 the individual who designed towers that were 
eventually depicted in the film, Batman Forever, sued, claiming that his copyright 
in his sculptural work has violated.  The Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court 
determination that the work was instead an architectural work and afforded more 
limited protection.59  While the ruling was based on the limitations of the 
protections afforded to architectural works rather than the creation of a new legal 
concept, some dicta in the opinion provides compelling guidance.  “The 801 Tower 
and the two lantern towers and two smoke towers in the streetwall appear briefly 
as background in a few scenes in the movie. The building is the Gotham City bank 
where nefarious deeds occur before Batman comes to the rescue.”60  While focusing 
on the particular usage of a single verb is by no means conclusive, the language is 
still important.  The use of the architecture in an independently copyrightable 
setting alters the very identity of the original architecture.  The fictional facts 
surrounding the attack on the Gotham City bank altered the original real life 
setting.  Now that building is copyrighted AS the Gotham City bank.  This was 
accepted without discussion or comment by the court61 and lays the groundwork for 
copyrighting far more than one building. 
 An illustrative example of this can be seen, once again, in The Dark Knight 
Rises.  The JP Morgan building, well known to many a visitor to New York City’s 
Financial District, is portrayed as the Gotham Stock Exchange in an early act of the 
film.62  While a photograph of the building would not (in and of itself) be protectable 
by copyright, the film impresses an artificial identity on the building, and with that 
new identity comes copyright protection. 
 Next we move to some limitations on copyright, exemplified in Idema v. 
Dreamworks.63  Copyright can only be extended to those portions of an expression 
that are original, and while there is only a de minimis showing required, that 
showing is still needed. “Plaintiffs claim that the…character in the film is the 
                                                          
55 Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). 
56 Idema v. Dreamworks, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, 90 F. 
App'x 496 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh'g (Mar. 9, 2004). 
57 Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
58 Leicester, 232 F.3d 1212. 
59 Id. at 1214. 
60 Id. at 1215 (emphasis added). 
61 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215. 
62 See infra Appendix. 
63 Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129. 
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substantial equivalent of the…character described only in a one-paragraph 
character summary at the conclusion [of the book]…However, a couple of sentences 
of vague description are clearly not enough to create a protectable character under 
copyright.”64  This core concept underlying copyright law would extend to any 
attempt to copyright generic scenes modified by fictional facts.  While this 
potentially gives rise to some pitfalls or weaknesses in attempting this sort of 
protection,65 the “character” of the cities represented in DC/Warner Brothers 
properties has been established and developed over decades.66 
 Scènes à faire are not permanently consigned to the land of non-copyrightable 
material.  It is possible to add additional creative elements to something previously 
deemed to be a generic scènes à faire and create a new, copyrightable whole.  While 
Lexmark International does not focus on fictional facts, the case nonetheless 
describes the level of effort required to elevate previously non-copyrightable 
material to the sphere of copyrightable expression.  The protected work at issue 
here was a computer program, which is subject to the “abstraction-filtration-
comparison test”67 and requires a level of dissection in order to determine the actual 
copyright-eligible aspects of a work.  “In trying to discern whether these doctrines 
apply, courts tend to ‘focus on whether the idea is capable of various modes of 
expression.’…The question, however, is not whether any alternatives theoretically 
exist; it is whether other options practically exist under the circumstances.”68   
 Whether it is a choice made in computer code or the development of a story, 
choice itself is often enough to meet the de minimis standard explained in Feist.69  
Once that standard is met, the subject in question is no longer subject to the scènes 
à faire doctrine or the merger doctrine, emerging as its own copyrightable 
expression.  It does seem obvious that courts will require a little more of a showing 
to lock down a portrayal of an iconic city rather than the code used to control toner 
cartridges.  Furthermore, Lexmark deals exclusively with the non-utilitarian 
programming choices that should be exhibited when seeking copyright protection 
over a computer program and does not speak directly to using fictional facts to do 
the same thing.  However, fictional facts combined with the non-utilitarian choice of 
a real life city can potentially be used as a functional equivalent. 
                                                          
64 Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. 
65 See infra part III(C). 
66 While examples abound in each fictional city used, the most telling is the dichotomy between 
Gotham and Metropolis. These settings are both intended to represent “the city” as an ideal and as a 
character. Gotham represents the dark aspects of the city while Metropolis takes on the glorified 
positive aspects. This “black and white” portrayal, common in comic books, serves to characterize the 
cities in a far more developed manner than the character at issue in Idema. 
67 See Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
68 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 536 (citations omitted). 
69 Id. 
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 When analyzing the various rules outlined above, a new rule can be 
synthesized.  If there is an artistic or creative choice at play in the selection of the 
scene to be used, and if that choice incorporates creative aspects that are in 
themselves copyrightable and surpass the bar set by Idema, then the supposed 
scène à faire is no longer a scène à faire.  Applying that rule to the facts of comic 
book films, we would first look to the choices of the film-makers.  In his Dark 
Knight Trilogy, Christopher Nolan clearly made choices that were purely creative.  
He did not need to use New York as his backdrop.  In fact, in earlier films Chicago 
was the ‘body double’ for Gotham City.  He did not need to use one city or the other 
(or in fact any real city at all, a computer generated or artistic rendering of Gotham 
worked sufficiently for Burton and Schumaker).  The second step of the analysis is 
to examine the ‘character’ at issue; Gotham City.  Throughout decades of 
interpretation and development, the character of Gotham City has clearly developed 
beyond “a couple of sentences” as in Idema.70   
 The result is an independently copyrightable scene.  The true power of this 
rule, however, is seen when another film-maker attempts to create a Batman film.  
Chicago has been used as Gotham, as has New York City.71  Any attempt to portray 
Gotham using those cities would infringe on the independently copyrightable 
expression articulated by Christopher Nolan and owned by Warner Brothers.  The 
use of just a few more suitable cities in this manner would result in forcing 
competing film-makers into a choice between limited and unenviable alternatives; 
use a less iconic city and thus lose the force of that association, adopt a perhaps far 
more costly plan of utilizing digital effects to create a city from scratch, or abandon 
the project altogether. 
C. Pitfalls and Workarounds 
 It is critically important to note that this solution is far from perfect.  Setting 
aside the possibility that a court may be unwilling to adopt this interpretation of 
integrating scènes à faire with fictional facts, flaws and workarounds (by which a 
clever film-maker could defeat this concept) still exist.   
 First and perhaps most importantly, even if courts allow scènes à faire to be 
modified into copyrightable expression in this way, there are still avenues open to 
exploit these characters by inventive competitors.  Novels, animated films, even 
potentially video games are potential areas of exploitation.  While they have not 
proven to be nearly as lucrative as the live action films have been, they will remain 
completely untouched by this method of extending copyright protections. 
                                                          
70 Idema, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. 
71 BATMAN BEGINS (Warner Brothers Entertainment 2005) (Chicago as Gotham); THE DARK KNIGHT 
RISES (Warner Brothers Entertainment 2012) (New York as Gotham).  
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 Perhaps more worrisome is the fact that films based on comic books are 
becoming as much a genre as westerns or noir films.72  Scènes à faire are linked to 
specific types of expression or genres as a matter of definition, and portions of 
creative works deemed indispensable to one genre will not be scènes à faire in 
others.  As the “superhero” genre becomes more established and recognized as its 
own category of expression, it will develop its own specific scènes à faire, which may 
very well include the type of city “stand-ins” described in this note.   
 Adding to this concern is the likelihood that aggressive use of this method 
will push these copyrighted scenes right back into the territory of unprotected 
scènes à faire.  Even if the integration concept is legally accepted, implementing it 
too often and cornering the market on any conceivable city used in this manner will 
result in the same effect that occurred in Lexmark: the application of the scènes à 
faire and merger doctrines will strip these scenes of their copyright and open up 
these properties to the very exploitation that the owners sought to prevent.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Utilizing fictional facts to transform unprotected scènes à faire into expression 
protected by copyright has the very real potential to extend copyright protection 
over comic book characters as it relates to film depictions of them.  Because this 
would be a novel extension of copyright concepts and doctrines, the success of this 
theory is far from certain.  While past cases give insight into the arguments that 
may succeed, it is not a method that should be relied on exclusively. 
 Should it be adopted – or even attempted – the most important thing to 
remember is that this does not constitute bulletproof protection of valuable 
intellectual properties.  When combined with trademark arguments and the 
potential for extending copyright terms again, it provides an additional avenue to 
seek further protection, but it will not likely stand on its own. 
 Perhaps most importantly, this author takes no stance on the wisdom of 
attempting or relying on this approach.  The purpose of this note is to explore the 
possibilities in seeking further protection on an industry that has evolved from 
selling five cent comic books to bringing in billions of dollars in revenue on an 
annual basis.  Comic books have evolved from being a niche interest to a true 
commercial juggernaut, and those who own these properties will need every tool at 
their disposal to attempt to protect them.  
                                                          
72 Mark Hughes, Why Marvel is Defining the Modern Superhero Film Genre, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2013, 
8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markhughes/2013/10/29/why-marvel-is-defining-the-modern-
superhero-film-genre/.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Preceding still image is referred to supra part IV(A). 
 
 
 
Preceding still image is referred to supra part IV(B). 
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Please note that the above images are still shots taken from the film The Dark 
Knight Rises, the copyright in which belongs to Warner Brothers Entertainment.  
They are reproduced here for educational purposes only and without permission 
under the fair use doctrine. 
